‘Monnet’s Error?’. LEQS Discussion Paper No. 83/2014 November 2014 by Guiso, Luigi et al.
 
 
LSE	  ‘Europe	  in	  Question’	  Discussion	  Paper	  Series   
‘Monnet’s  Error?’ 
 
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales 
 
LEQS Paper No. 83/2014 November 2014 
LEQS is generously supported by the LSE Annual Fund    
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the editors or the LSE. 
© Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales 
Editorial Board Dr Joan Costa-i-Font Dr Vassilis Monastiriotis Dr Sara Haemann Dr Katjana Gattermann Ms Sonja Avlijas  
  
Monnet’s  Error? 
 
Luigi Guiso*, Paola Sapienza** & Luigi 
Zingales***  
Abstract 
 
Do partial steps toward European integration generate support for further steps or do 
they create a political backlash? We try to answer this question by analyzing the cross 
sectional and time series variation in pro-European sentiments in the EU 15 countries. 
The two major steps forward (the 1992  Maastricht  Treaty  and  the  2004  enlargement)  
seem  to  have  reduced  the  pro-Europe sentiment as does the 2010 Eurozone crisis. 
Yet, in spite of the worst recession in recent history, the Europeans still support the 
common currency. Europe seems trapped in catch-22: there is no desire to go backward, 
no interest in going forward, but it is economically unsustainable to stay still. 
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Monnet’s  Error? 
 
 
L’Europe se fera dans les crises et elle sera la somme des solutions apportées à ces 
crises. 
[Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions 
adopted for those crises.] 
 
Monnet, J. (1976) Mémoires (Paris: Fayard). 
 
 
 
 
The process of European integration has been one of the most significant 
institutional changes in the world during the last 60 years. What started as a 
limited economic  cooperation  project  involving  only  six  nations  is  now  a  
political  entity involving 28 countries. The “dream” of a generation 
emerging from the disasters of World War II has now become an 
institutional reality, with a common market, a common currency,  a  common  
central  bank,  and  a  lot  of  common  regulation. Much of this evolution 
took place in leaps and bounds at time of crises. It was the tension of the Cold 
War that pushed the formation of the first European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and it was (at least in part) the fall of the Berlin Wall that 
accelerated the creation of the common currency. In this respect, the progress 
of the European Union seems to fit the prediction made by Monnet (one of 
its founding fathers), that Europe will be forged in crises. 
 
Following  the  2010  euro  crisis,  however,  the  consensus  toward  Europe  
in Southern Europe dropped significantly (from 54% to 44%), reaching the 
lowest level among all the regions. Not only the European project is losing 
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support as a result of the crisis, but it is losing even more support among the 
youngest  generations.  Was  Monnet’s  wrong  or   is   it   just  a  temporary  blip   in  
an otherwise successful strategy? 
 
In this paper we try to answer this question by examining the evolution of 
Europeans’  sentiments  toward  the  European  integration  project  from  1973  to  
2013.  By  using  Eurobarometer’s  surveys  we  put  together  the  longest  possible  
time   series   of   questions   regarding   Europeans’   perceptions   of   the   past   and  
future benefits of European membership, support for the common currency 
as well as the level of trust in European institutions  in  the  15  European  
countries  that  joined  Europe  up  to  1995  (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden). 
 
The functionalist view, advanced by Jean Monnet, assumes that moving 
some policy functions to the supranational level will create pressure for more 
integration through both positive feedback loops (as voters realize the 
benefits of integrating some functions and will want to integrate more) and 
negative ones (as partial integration leads to inconsistences that force further 
integration).   In   the   functionalists’   view   integration   is   not the result of a 
democratic process, but the product of an enlightened élite’s effort. In its 
desire to push forward the European agenda, this élite accepts to make 
unsustainable integration steps, in the hope that future crises will force 
further integration. In the words of Padoa-Schioppa (2004, p. 14), a passionate 
Europe-supporter,  who  espoused   this   theory,  “[T]he  road   toward   the  single  
currency looks like a chain reaction in which each step resolved a preexisting 
contradiction and generated a new one that in turn required a further step  
forward.” 
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A more benign interpretation of this “chain reaction theory” is that 
European voters desire more integration, but local politicians do not, because 
they do not want to give up their power. Thus, it is incumbent upon 
enlightened pro-European technocrats to force the politicians’ hands, taking 
advantage of any opportunity, especially at moment of crises. 
 
Both interpretations of the chain reaction theory, however, rely on the 
assumption that the contradictions are always resolved with a step forward, 
not a step backward, leading to further support for the European project. In a 
democracy, this outcome depends very much on how crises affect the 
political support for the European project and how costly it is to revert back. 
Do Europe-related crises increase the skepticism toward the European project 
or do they generate more demand for European integration? Does integration 
lead to further demand for integration? 
 
To answer  these  questions  we  analyze  the  cross  sectional  and  time  
series variations in attitudes of European voters and how they change at 
three crucial times: the 1992 Maastricht treaty, the 2004 enlargement to 
Eastern Europe, and the 2010 Eurozone crisis. 
 
To begin with there is a very different level of pro-European sentiment 
(Europhilia), across EU members. Initially, Southern European countries 
were much more pro-Europe than Northern European ones. This difference 
appears related to the quality of institutions of each country vis-à-vis 
Germany. The worse the relative quality of domestic institutions, the higher 
the demand for Europe was. 
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When we look at the temporal patterns of Europhilia, we find that between 
1973   and   1991   Europeans’   views   about   the   current   benefits   of   European  
membership improved considerably. This increase seems consistent with the 
positive   feedback   loop   implicit   in   Monnet’s   chain   reaction   theory:   the  
experience of a common governance leads to an increased demand for more 
common governance. 
 
This  positive  feedback  loop,  however,  seems  to  break  down  with  the  
1992 Maastricht treaty. There is a drop in support for European membership 
and by looking at individual data this drop is highly correlated with a 
reduced support for the single market and for further political integration.  
This step seems to have created a permanent backlash. The same effect occurs 
after the 2004 European enlargement to Eastern Europe and with the 2010 
Euro crisis. 
 
While the question on past benefits of European membership exhibit a 
similar behavior, the attitudes towards the common currency and the trust 
towards the EU and the ECB show very different patterns. The support for 
the Euro seems to be remarkably stable, in spite of the Eurozone crisis, while 
trust in European institutions plummeted, even more so than the trust 
toward national institutions. Europeans have not given up on the European 
project, but do not like the way it is managed. 
 
By using the surveys before and after the watershed moments, we build 
pseudo- panels (Deaton, 1985) to probe deeper into the causes of the 
consensus drop. The deterioration in the support for Europe in 1992 appears 
directly linked to a worsening in opinion regarding the benefits of a single 
European market, a single currency, and further political integration. This 
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effect is similar across all countries, with the exception of Denmark, for which 
is worse. 
 
By contrast, the drop in support for Europe around the 2004 enlargement 
seems to be mostly driven by country-specific factors. In particular, the 
support for the single currency drops significantly among Southern 
European countries. 
 
Finally, when we look at the Eurozone crisis, the most important determinant 
seems to be the level of unemployment, which affects negatively the support 
for Europe. After the adoption of the Euro, the interest rate spread of a 
country public debt vis-à-vis the German Bunds also has a negative impact 
on support for EU membership for the Eurozone countries. This effect, 
however, disappear if we allow a separate time trend for Southern European 
countries. We confirm this evidence by creating a pseudo-panel with the two 
surveys before and after the crisis and using individual perceptions of the 
economic conditions, rather than macro level variables. 
 
Because the single currency forces also a single monetary policy, 
disappointment with Europe may arise because common policy decisions 
may be suboptimal from a domestic point of view.  To estimate how much of 
the disenchantment towards Europe is correlated with the suboptimality of a 
common monetary policy, we compute the difference between the country 
optimal Taylor rule and the ECB policy rule for each country. We find that 
these deviations are highly predictive of the drop in support for Europe and 
in the trust towards the ECB. Yet, paradoxically, they are not predictive of the 
drop in support for the common currency. Europeans seem to believe in the 
common currency, not in the way it is managed. 
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Most Europeans are unhappy with the direction that the European Union has 
right now, but they still consider it a useful institution to deal with crises.  In 
spite of the worst recession in recent history, the Europeans still believe in the 
common currency. Yet, they show no appetite to delegate more power to the 
EU. 
 
Since the survival of the Euro is dependent upon further transfers of national 
powers to the EU, then the European Project is in a catch-22. Europeans do 
not want to go forward, they do not want to go backward, but they cannot 
stay still. 
 
 
1. Theories of the European Integration Process 
 
The process of European Integration has been greatly influenced by the 
functionalist view, as interpreted and advanced by Jean Monnet, one of the 
EU founding founders. The functionalist view postulates that European 
integration is mostly pushed by élites and interest groups that transcend 
national boundaries (Haas (1958, 1964). It is called "functionalism" 
(sometimes neo functionalism) because it aims at transferring specific 
"functions" to supranational institutions (for an excellent overview on the 
topic, see Spolaore, 2013). 
 
The functionalist approach finds its first institutional implementation in the 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty.  The treaty established five 
main institutions, which constituted the foundation of the institutional 
framework of the European Community (Laffan and Mazey, 2006).   These 
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institutions, which do not respond directly to voters, are deputized to push 
further the integration process. 
 
The institutional counterpart to this strategy is the so called methode 
communautaire (Community Method), which granted to the European 
Commission (composed of appointed members)  a central role in formulating 
proposals. The appointment method naturally led to a Commission 
populated by pro-Europe members, who always pushed for further 
integration. 
 
A  corollary  of  this  approach  is  that  the  Commission  must  not  be  
highly politicized, but must represent all mainstream parties in Europe.  In so 
doing this method favored the formation of an élite of pro-Europe 
bureaucrats, with little or no political accountability.  It is what Marquand 
(1979)  calls  Europe’s  “democratic  deficit”. 
 
As discussed in Spolaore (2013), functionalists believe that moving some 
policy functions to the supranational level creates pressure for more 
integration through both positive and negative feedback loops. The positive 
feedback occurs as politicians and voters observe the benefits of integrating 
some functions and will want to integrate more. The negative feedback 
occurs when partial integration leads to institutional and economic 
inconsistences that will push further integration by forcing the introduction 
of the complementary reforms needed. Needless to say, for the negative 
feedback mechanism to push further integration that fixes the institutional 
inconsistencies, it must be true that dismantling the initial integration is 
costly – that is institutional and economic integration comes with 
irreversibility, so that pushing forward may be less costly than pulling back. 
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According to Eichengreen (2006) and Pierson (1996) technocrats typically 
start from narrow areas of expertise (e.g. coal, steel) where they have an 
informational advantage and voters and national politicians are not able to 
predict or anticipate the contradictions generated by these partial 
integrations, nor are interested in opposing them because they affect a 
limited number of voters. 
 
A   leading   example   of   this   “burning   the   ships”   strategy   is   the   euro.   In   the  
words of the former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt “This is the great 
strength of the euro, that nobody can leave it without damaging his own 
country  and  his  own  economy  in  a  severe  way.”1 
 
As   explained   by   Monnet’s   collaborator   George   Ball   (1994):   “Monnet  
recognized that   the   very   irrationality of   this   scheme   might   provide   
the pressure to achieve exactly what he wanted - the triggering of a chain 
reaction. The awkwardness and complexity resulting from the singling out of 
coal and steel would drive member governments to accept the idea of 
pooling  other  production  as  well.” 
 
At least some European founding fathers seem to have conceived the 
mechanism knowing that these inconsistences would lead to crises. These 
crises were seen as opportunities to force further integration which voters 
would have not favored otherwise. In the words of Romano Prodi, one of 
these founding fathers, "I am sure the euro will oblige us to introduce a new 
set of economic policy instruments. It is politically impossible to propose that 
                                                        1 "In an interview with David Marsh in 2007 cited in David Marsh “The Euro: The Politics of the New Global Currency” Yale University Press; 2009, p. 255.  
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now. But some day there will be a crisis and new instruments will be 
created." 
 
Therefore, in order for the functionalist approach to work, an initial 
integration step should lead to more demand for integration later, either 
through the positive or the negative feedback loop (or both). Most 
importantly, the functionalist approach implicitly assumes that there is no 
risk of a backlash, pushing the integration project backward. Padoa-
Schioppa, one of the founding father of the euro, once said that the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) has the same name of an ostrich-like Australian 
bird.  “Neither,”  he  said,  “can  go  backwards.”2 
 
Yet, there is a contradiction implicit in this approach. On the one hand, this 
strategy makes sense only if further integration is not desired today. If voters 
were in favor of further integration from the start, the functionalist approach 
would be redundant. On the other hand, if voters were against further 
integration and fully anticipated the feedback effects, they will oppose even 
the first move. Thus, to work the functionalist approach requires a certain 
degree   of   voters’   deception,  which   adds   to   the   perception   of   a   democratic  
deficit. 
 
In  this  paper  we  analyze  the  public  opinion  regarding  the  European  
project   through   the   lenses   of   Monnet’s   conjecture.   First,   we   analyze   the  
functioning of the positive feedback loop. In particular, we study whether the 
pro European sentiment evolves as a function of the time spent in the Union. 
We also analyze the evolution of a country xenophobic attitude as a function 
of the number of immigrants coming from Europe and from outside of                                                         2 Lorenzo  Totaro,  Brian  Swint  and  Flavia  Krause-Jackson,  “Padoa-Schioppa,   Euro  Architect, Founding Member of ECB Board, Dies at 70, Bloomberg.com  Dec 19, 2010." 
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Europe. It is possible that mistrust toward other nations and citizens prevents 
comprehensive integration, at the start, but as citizens learn to trust other 
immigrants and get to know them, the public opinions may shift. According 
to this hypothesis, as Europe becomes more integrated, especially with the 
abolition of the internal border of control and several European initiatives, 
such as the Erasmus program, European citizens learn to trust more their 
counterparts. This positive feedback could, in turn, change positively the 
sentiment toward further integration. 
 
Second, we analyze the negative feedback loop at three critical junctures of 
the European project: i) the signing of the Maastricht treaty; ii) the 2004 EU 
enlargement to Eastern Europe; iii) the effect of the 2010 Eurozone crisis. 
 
 
2. The Data  
2.1 The Eurobarometer Surveys 
 
The Eurobarometer surveys are the product of a unique program of cross 
national and cross temporal social science research. The effort began in the 
early 1970s, when the European Economic Community (EEC)’s Commission 
sponsored simultaneous surveys in the EEC to measure public awareness of, 
and attitudes towards, the Common Market and the European Community 
institutions. In 1974, the EEC Commission launched the Eurobarometer 
series, designed to provide a regular monitoring of the social and political 
attitudes in the nine member-nations: France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg. 
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These Eurobarometer surveys are carried out in the spring and fall of each 
year. In addition to regular readings of support for European integration, 
each survey explores some special topics. Beginning with Barometer 7 in the 
spring of 1977, the surveys measure also the support for the European 
Parliament. 
 
The geographic scope of Eurobarometer surveys has gone hand in hand with 
the  Community’s  enlargement  process:  it  has  included  Greece  since  fall  1980,  
Portugal and Spain since Fall 1985, the former German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany) since 1990, Finland since the Spring of 1993, and Sweden and 
Austria since the Fall of 1994. Since the 2004 eastern enlargement of the 
Union, the survey has included the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
the Baltic States, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In spring 2007 
Romania and Bulgaria have also been included. 
 
For the sake of consistency, we excluded citizens from countries not yet in the 
European Union at the time of the survey3 as well as respondents below the 
age of 18. Among all the Eurobarometer waves, we select those in which 
questions about the attitudes towards membership, the euro, and the 
European Central Bank are asked, as well as questions on trust in the national 
institutions, voting behavior in the elections for the European Parliament and 
in the national general elections. The exact wording of these questions is 
reported below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         3 So that, for instance, Finns are included since spring 1995 as opposed to spring 1993. 
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QUESTION   WORDING         MEMBERSHIP       Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of 
the European Union is (Good, Neither good nor bad, Bad)? We compute the share of respondents who answer Good.4  BENEFIT               Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) 
has on balance benefitted or not from being a member of the European 
Union (Benefitted, Not benefitted)?. We compute the share of 
respondents who answer Benefitted. 
 EURO               Please	   tell	  me	   for	  each	  proposal,	  whether	  you	  are	  for	   it	  or	  against	   it.	   […]	  
There has to be one single currency, the euro, replacing the (NATIONAL 
CURRENCY) and all other national  currencies  of the member  states of 
the European  Union. 
 (For, Against). We compute the share of respondents who answer 
“For”. 
 TRUST EU For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it 
or	  tend	  not	  to	  trust	   it?	  […]	  The	  European Union. (Tend to trust, Tend not 
to	   trust).	   WE	   compute	   the	   share	   of	   respondents	   who	   answer	   “Tend	   to	  
trust”. 
 
TRUST ECB         For each of  [the following European institutions], please tell me if you tend 
to trust it or tend not	  to	  trust	  it?	  […]	  The European Central Bank (Tend to 
trust, Tend not to trust). We compute the share of respondents who 
answer	  	  “Tend	  to	  trust”. 
 
The MEMBERSHIP variable is a measure of the view of the current and 
future benefits of belonging to the EU. By contrast, the variable BENEFIT 
represents an assessment about the past benefits, while we interpret TRUST 
EU as an assessment of how the European project is managed. Similarly, the                                                         4 In  earlier  datasets  the  coding  of  the  third  option  “Neither  good  nor  bad”	    is  inconsistent. Even after reviewing the codebooks  we were unable to reach a desired level of confidence  in our results.  For this reason we limited ourselves to the dichotomist choice.  
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EURO variable assesses the beliefs in the necessity of a common currency, 
while we interpret the TRUST ECB variable as a judgment on the way the 
common currency is managed. In this way we are able to distinguish 
between opinions about the validity of the European unification project and 
opinions about the performance of the current European institutions. As we 
will see, this distinction will turn out to be empirically important. 
 
The summary statistics of these variables are contained in Table 1. Panel A 
reports the individual data, while Panels B and C report averages by country. 
Finally, Panel D reports sample statistics on electoral variables. For a detailed 
description of these variables see Table A1 in Appendix. 
 
2.2 Demographic variables 
 
The Eurobarometer surveys contain information on the date of birth of 
respondents. By using this date, we cluster people in five cohorts: the War II 
generation (born before 1945), the post War II generation (between 1946 and 
1957), the baby boom generation (between 1958 and 1967), the Erasmus 
generation (so called because they benefitted from European fellowship 
program to study abroad between 1968 and 1979), and the millennia 
generation (born after 1979). 
 
The Eurobarometer surveys contain also data on years of education and 
occupation recoded in 10 categories.5 
                                                         5 1. Farmer, Fisherman (Skipper); 2. Professional- Lawyer, Accountant, Etc; 3. Business Owner Of Shop, Craftsman, Proprietor; 4. Manual Worker; 5. White Collar- Office Worker; 6. Executive, Top Management, Director; 7. Retired; 8. Housewife, Not Otherwise Employed;  9. Student, Military Service; 10. Unemployed, D.K., N.A..."  
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2.3 Macroeconomic Variables 
 
The exact description of the macroeconomic variables we use is contained 
in Table A.1 in the Appendix. For the unemployment rate (unemployed 
persons as a share of the total active population) we use the Annual Macro-
Economic Database of the European Commission; for inflation, the OECD 
Consumer Price Indices. As ECB policy rate we use the Marginal Lending 
Facility Rate (MLR), i.e. the interest rate at which mayor financial institutions 
obtain overnight liquidity from national central banks in the Eurosystem, 
against eligible assets. We obtain the pre-Euro national central bank discount 
rate from the IMF International Financial Statistics (line 60). 
 
The gross contributions to – and receipts from – the E.U. budget is from 
Kauppi and Widgren (2004) for the period 1976-2001 and from Financial 
Programming and Budget - Revenue and Expenditures file for 2001-2012. 
 
2.4 Attitudinal and Cultural Variables 
 
We derive some indicators of cultural and attitudinal differences across 
countries from the European Social Studies surveys.  As indicators of racism 
we use the answer to the following question  “On  this  list  are  various  groups  
of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like not to have 
as  neighbors?”  One  measure  (called  “no  neighbors: race”) equals to one if the 
respondent mentions “People of a different race” as a possible answer. The 
other measure (called “no neighbors: immigrants”) equals to one if the 
respondent  mentions  “People  of  a  different  race”  as  a  possible  answer.   
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As  a  measure  of  pride  we   use   the  question   “how  proud  are   you   to  be   a   ...  
(country)   citizen.” We compute the share of respondents who declare 
themselves Very Proud on a 4pt scale (1 = Very Proud, 2 = Quite Proud, 3 = 
Not very proud, 4 = Not at all proud). 
 
The  genetic  distance  is  the  bilateral  genetic  distances  between  countries 
computed by Cavalli Sforza (2000) and used by Guiso et al. (2009) and 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). 
 
 
3. Sentiment toward the European Union 
 
Before analyzing the evolution of sentiments toward Europe it is important to 
study whether citizens of different countries have a different baseline attitude 
vis-à-vis the European project. As the Union was formed, did the initial level 
of support differ across countries? Why? 
 
Table 2 shows the sentiments toward the European project the first time this 
question was asked (which changes from question to question and from 
country to country). The oldest question is whether EU membership is a good 
thing for the country, which was asked since 1973. For the core countries 
(France, Belgium, The Netherland, Germany, and Italy), thus, the question is 
asked several years after they joined the EU, something we need to keep in 
mind in the interpretation. 
 
The first column reports the fraction of people, by country, who answer 
“Good”   to   the   question   “Generally   speaking,   do   you   think   that   (OUR 
COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is (Good, Neither good 
Monnet’s	  Error? 
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nor   bad,   Bad)?”   The   data   show   a   large   difference   of   opinions   across  
geographical areas. Among the core countries there is an overwhelming 
majority in support, with Italy being the most favorable (80%) and France 
being the least favorable (69%). By contrast, for later entrants the picture is 
mixed. United Kingdom (36%) and Denmark (46%) joined with only a 
minority supporting the EU. So did Greece (42%), Sweden (40%), and Austria 
(42%). Instead, Portugal (72%) and Spain (78%) enjoyed a large majority of 
supporters for the project at the time of entry. 
 
The remarkable difference in support between early and later entrant (73% vs 
52%) may reflect a selection effect (the more enthusiastic joined first) or an 
acquired taste effect (consistent with the positive feedback effect predicted by 
the functionalist approach). 
 
The other answers show a similar pattern. Yet, there are some differences.  
The fraction of respondents who in 1984 agreed that their country benefitted 
from being a member of the European Union is the majority in France (55%), 
Belgium (52%), the Netherland (69%), Luxemburg (72%) and Ireland (61%), 
while is less than half in Germany (41%), Denmark (44%), Greece (47%) and 
the UK (34%). The difference may reflect the fact that this question focuses on 
the past (have you benefited), rather than the present/future (is membership 
good today).6 
 
On average, citizens of the core countries seem to trust the European Union 
less than they think it is beneficial. The fraction of respondents who trust it 
are the majority only in Italy (63%) and Luxembourg (76%). Among the late 
                                                        6 “For the newcomers, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and Finland Sweden and Austria in 1995, the answer has not much relevance, since they have just joined the EU." 
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entrants, Southern countries have a more positive view, while Northern ones 
do not trust the European Union. 
 
Can we explain these differences in opinion with country-specific variables? 
To this purpose, we extract the country fixed effects from the following O.L.S. 
regression run on the sample of respondents to the pooled Eurobarometer 
surveys in the year when a country entered the EU (or 1973 for the original 
six countries): 
 
(1)    Membership୧୨୲ = α+βX୧୨୲ + γD୨ + ϵ୧୨୲ 
 
where i stands for individual, j for country and t for the entry year. The 
Membership variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a respondent answers 
“Good”  to  the  Membership  question   in   that  country  year.  Xijt are individual 
demographics (gender, cohorts, education, occupation), and Dj are country 
fixed effects. 
 
Figure 1 plots the country fixed-effects (relative to Germany) derived from 
(1). There is a very strong North-South component in these country fixed 
effects. The picture is similar (not reported) if, instead of the Membership 
variable, we use   Benefit (a dummy variable =1 if a respondent thinks that 
his country has on   balance       benefitted from EU), the support for the Euro, 
or the Trust in EU and ECB.   For simplicity, we will refer to all these 
variables measuring the support towards the European projects as Europhilia 
indicators. 
 
In  Table  3  we  regress  these  countries’  fixed  effects  on  potential  determinants  
of Europhilia. Each RHS variable is a proxy for a motive for supporting 
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Europe cited in the public debate. Since we only have 15 observations, we 
run univariate regressions with each of the variables in the rows of Table 2.A 
as RHS variables. Each entry in the table shows the slope coefficient (and its 
standard error) of the regression where the LHS is the variable reported at 
the top of the column and the RHS is the one variable indicated at the 
beginning of the row. Statistically significant coefficients are marked in bold. 
 
Though not all motives should affect each indicator of support for the 
European project, we are not very successful in explaining these country 
fixed effects. Given the number of right hand side variables, the level of 
statistical significance is close to what we would expect just by chance. Thus, 
the main objective of this table is to show which theories do not matter. 
 
To begin with, a prevailing view is that Europe was the response to the 
horrors of the two World Wars. For this reason, we use as a possible 
determinant of Europhilia the sum in number of deaths suffered by a country 
in World War I and in World War II divided by its population at the 
beginning of each war. We do not find any evidence to support that the 
European unification is a mere consequence of the destruction of the war. 
One  could  argue  that  the  relative  number  of  deaths  might  not  capture  
well  the destructions of war. However, countries that were spared the 
horrors of WWII, such a Spain and Portugal, exhibit a higher level of 
Europhilia than countries devastated by the war, such as Austria and 
England. 
 
Similarly, we do not find any support for   the   idea   that  a  country’s  average  
attitude towards Europe depends upon its relative GDP per capita, the ratio 
between Net Receipts from the EU and GDP, the openness to trade (proxying 
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for   an      “Economic   insurance”,   “Economic   Transfers”,   and   “Trade  
Opportunities”  motives,   respectively),   the   level   of   xenophobia,   the   level   of  
patriotism, and the genetic distance of its indigenous population with the 
indigenous population of the rest of the European Union (a proxy for cultural 
barriers). 
 
By contrast, a measure of institutional quality (the difference in each country 
government effectiveness vis-à-vis Germany, computed in 2007) seems to be 
correlated  with  Europhilia.  The  government  effectiveness   is  a  World  Bank’s  
World  Government  Indicator  Index,  capturing  “perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and  
implementation,  and  the  credibility  of  the  government's commitment  to  
such      policies      (increasing      in      government      capacity”      (Kauffman      et      al  
(2010)). Countries with more effective governments than Germany are less 
Europhile. By contrast, countries with relative bad institutions seem to be 
happier to be part of the EU. This result suggests that citizens believe that the 
European institutions will have a quality that averages the quality of the 
member states. Joining Europe could signify that the political  and  economic  
institutions  will  improve  in  the  European  Union  for  weaker quality 
countries. 
 
An alternative explanation is that institutional quality is a proxy for the years 
a country had democratic institutions. Thus, countries with younger 
democracies are more likely to favor the European project. We try to 
distinguish between these two hypotheses by correlating the number of years 
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each country had a democratic government with Europhilia.7 The results 
(unreported) show that proxies for democracy are not correlated with 
European consensus. 
 
We repeat the same exercise by using the variable BENEFIT, which measures 
the past benefit and not the future one. This question is not the most 
meaningful one for countries at entry, since they do not have much an 
experience. Not surprisingly, no variable seems to have any explanatory 
power. 
 
When it comes to support for the Euro, we find that, besides the relative 
institutional quality, also the xenophobia indicator seems to have an effect: 
more xenophobic countries tend to support the euro more. This effect seems 
to be the result of a higher level of xenophobia among southern European 
countries, who support the Euro more. 
 
In sum, attitudes towards Europe do not seem to be affected either by 
cultural barriers or by the claimed desired to avoid a future war. We find 
some support  for  the  “Institutional  quality  transfer.”8 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         7 From 1880 to today the number of years for each country Polity IV gives a score of 6 or more." 8 These  results  are  robust  to  using  the  sentiments  in  the  entire  sample  period.  If  instead  of correlating these factors with the country fixed effect residual from (1) we run a similar regression with the data for the entire period, including a time fixed effect. 
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4. The Temporal Dynamics of Europhilia 
 
With these different baselines in mind, we can now analyze the evolution of 
sentiments over time. 
 
4.1 Aggregate Analysis 
 
Figure 2 reports the evolution of the fraction of people with a positive 
sentiment about EU membership from 1973 to 2013 for the 15 core EU 
countries.9 In this figure we have grouped the countries into three areas, 
Northern Europe (Denmark, Ireland, and United Kingdom), Central Europe 
(France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg and Germany), and Southern 
Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). While there is some variation 
within each group, the geographical three-partition seems to fit the data well. 
Given the continuing enlargement of the EU, we are concerned that the 
increase in the set might confound the temporal pattern. For this reason, we 
limit the sample to the earliest 15 members, imputing to a missing country its 
entry level of the corresponding variable until it enters to make the series 
homogenous.10   However, in Figure 2, panels B, C, and D we analyze each 
country separately to distinguish any compositional effect deriving from new 
entrants’  opinions. 
 
Figure 2A shows a steady improvement in Europhilia during the period 
leading to the Maastricht Treaty (1992): at the peak, in the first quarter of 
                                                        9 Until 1991 the European Union was called European Economic Community. From now on we are going to refer it to EU, regardless of the time period. 10 The EU founding members were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg.  UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.  
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1992, the fraction of Southern Europe supporters was 69%, the fraction of 
Central European supporters was 62%, while  in  Northern  Europe  a  
majority  of  respondents  (54%)  believed  that  EU membership provided a 
benefit to their country. 
 
As Figure 2 panels B-D show most of the increase in consensus is 
concentrated among the Eurosceptic countries located in the North and in 
Greece. This trend seems consistent with the positive feedback reaction of 
Monnet. The support for Europe rises among initially skeptical countries 
thanks to a positive feedback effect of membership. 
 
The year 1992 is a watershed from many points of view. In February 1992 the 
Maastricht treaty is signed, establishing not only the path to a common 
currency, but also final political unification as the ultimate goal.  In 
September 1992 the Italian Lira and the British Pound were forced off the 
EMS system. Finally, in January 1993 the single market becomes a reality, 
thanks to the adoption of 280 pieces of legislation that replace national 
regulation with common European laws.11   It is hard to disentangle the 
relative importance of these three factors with aggregate data. Nevertheless, 
the fact that this drop is not concentrated or particularly pronounced in the 
two countries that were forced to exit the EMS rules out the EMS as a main 
factor. 
 
One possible interpretation – consistent  with  Monnet’s  chain  reaction  theory  
- is that the positive feedback loop generated by the initial European 
experience allows the pro-Europe élite to make a step forward, step that is 
later resented by voters, once they appreciate the consequences of this step.                                                         11 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/20years/singlemarket20/facts-figures/history_en.htm 
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An alternative interpretation is that to create support for a further integration 
step, the European Union spent a great deal in promoting the idea. This 
promotion temporarily boosted consensus. Once it subsided, consensus 
dropped. 
 
After 1992, the consensus toward Europe seems to decline. During this 
period the discontent is mostly concentrated among Southern European 
countries, the ones that were most enthusiastic to begin with. Over time the 
initial difference among pro-European countries and skeptics disappears and 
the ranking seems to flip in the last survey, where a minority (44%) in 
Southern Europe perceives membership as beneficial, while a majority 
supports the European project in Central Europe (60%) and in Northern 
Europe (53%). It looks as if Southern European countries initially believed in 
an institutional arbitrage (which would enable them to benefit from Northern 
European superior institutions at no cost). Over time they learned that there 
is no free lunch. 
 
In Figure 3 we plot the year fixed effects of a modified version of regression 
(1) where we consider all the years available ( t instead of being the entry 
year is any year from entry to 2012). These fixed effects capture the dynamic 
in Europhilia common to all the 15 countries after we control for 
demographic changes in the various countries.  It clearly confirms that 
overall there is a general increase in Europhilia from 1981 to 1991, followed 
by a large drop from 1992 to 1997. 
 
One may wonder whether the changes over time are due to the same people 
switching opinion or to younger generations having different opinions from 
older generations. Figure 4 tries to study this question. In the modified 
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version of regression (1) we estimated the cohort effects, leaving as omitted 
cohort the War II generation (born before 1945). These cohort fixed effects are 
plotted in Figure 4. 
 
Interestingly, all cohorts have a similar attitude toward Europe, with the 
exception of the millennia generation (born after 1979). Given the structure of 
the data, the evolution of beliefs of this generation only affects the more 
recent years. People born after 1979 are significantly more pro Europe at the 
beginning (1998) than all the other cohorts and they end up being 
significantly less favorable than all the other generations in 2012. To the 
extent the younger generation is predictive of future trends this is a 
worrisome sign for the European project.  Starting in 2003, all cohorts start to 
become less pro-Europe than the war generation, albeit these differences are 
not statistically significant. 
 
4.2 A Panel Analysis 
                                                                                                                                 
With these data we cannot clearly identify causality. Nevertheless, in this 
section we study how the sentiment toward Europe correlates with macro-
economic variables. In Table 4 we report the results of the following 
regression 
(2)        Membershipjt =α  +β  Xjt +γ  Dj +δ  Dt +  εjt 
 
where the symbol jt indicates the average across individuals in a given 
country-year of a certain variable, Dj are country fixed effects, Dt are time 
fixed effects, and Xjt are  country’s  characteristics  at   time   t. Thus, the LHS is 
the country average of the MEMBERSHIP variable in each year from 1973 to 
2012. 
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In column (1) we control only for year fixed effects, which explain 14% of the 
total variation. In column (2) we control only for country fixed effects, which 
explain 65% of the total variation. Controlling for year and country fixed 
effect at the same time (column (3)), we can explain 74% of the total variation. 
 
In column 4, instead of the year fixed effects, we insert a post 1992 dummy 
and a post 2004 one. Both have a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. This result confirms the visual impression of Figure 2. Yet, the 
year fixed effects have more explanatory variables than the two dummies. 
 
In column (5) we return to the specification in column (3) that includes both 
country and year fixed effects and add to it two economic variables that 
capture country specific macroeconomic dynamic: the level of 
unemployment and the difference between the yield of the local sovereign 
and that of the German Bund. This latter variable is computed only for 
countries belonging to the Eurozone (for the others it is set to zero). 
 
As expected the level of unemployment has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on Europhilia. A one percentage point increase in 
unemployment reduces MEMBERSHIP by one percentage point (16% of the 
sample mean).  A similar result is true for the spread. An extra percentage 
point in the spread reduces MEMBERSHIP in a Eurozone country by 75 basis 
points (12% of the sample mean). 
 
Interestingly, when we look at the year fixed effects (not reported) the 2011 
and 2012 dummies lose statistical significance if we insert these two variables 
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relatively to the omitted years.12 Thus, the drop in Europhilia in recent years 
seems to be entirely explainable with economic factors. 
 
In commenting Figure 2 we noticed that most of the post 2004 drop was 
concentrated in Southern European countries. For this reason in column (6) 
we interact the post 2004 dummy with the South dummy. The post 2004 
dummy becomes insignificant, suggesting that the effect is concentrated in 
the Southern countries. Instead, the post Maastricht dummy remains 
significant, albeit some of the effect is absorbed by the unemployment 
variable. Because 1992 and 2004 are particularly relevant points in the data 
we will try to study them in more detail in the next session by using the 
micro-level data. 
 
In Column (6) the magnitude of the interest rate spread coefficient drops to a 
third of its previous level and loses statistical significance. The most likely 
interpretation is that the spread variable was capturing the effect of the post 
2004 variable limited to the Southern countries. Once we allow for this 
separate trend, the spread variable per se does not have an impact, while the 
unemployment variable continues to have an impact. The effect of 
unemployment on whether EU membership is perceived as beneficial is not 
different across different periods: when we interact unemployment and some 
specific year dummies (euro-crises years) we do not find a significant 
coefficient. 
 
Thus far, we have focused all our attention on MEMBERSHIP, for which we 
have the longest time series. The pattern for the BENEFIT variable 
(unreported), which is available only since 1983, is very similar. By contrast, 
                                                        12 An F-test of the dummies of 2011 and 2012 has a p value of 0.25. 
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales 
27                          
the picture is quite different if we look at the trust toward the EU (Figure 5). 
While this variable is available only since 1997, it presents a much more 
dramatic pattern. Among Southern European countries trust towards the EU 
drops from 70% to 20% in six years. For the rest of Europe the drop is less 
pronounced, but still very large (from 62% to 37% for the Central countries 
and from 59% to 35% for the Northern ones).  Thus, while Europeans 
continue to see the benefits of the EU membership, they are very unhappy of 
the way this membership is managed by the current institutions. This 
performance suggests that if the founding fathers hoped to win over the 
skeptics, they miscalculated that the public opinion could be turned against 
European institutions, rather than convinced of their necessity. 
 
It is possible that this malcontent is entirely driven by economic conditions. 
In the last six years Europe has been affected by a recession that is in many 
cases deeper and longer than the one experienced in the 1930s.  Hence, it is 
not surprising, that Europeans express their dissatisfaction toward existing 
institutions, being them national or supranational. Thus, to assess the health 
of the European project we should not focus too much on the trust towards 
the EU, but on the relationship between the trust towards the EU and the 
trust towards the local government. The ratio between these two variables is 
plotted in Figure 6. 
 
Consistent with our previous results, on average Southern European people 
trust the EU more than their local governments, while Center and North 
Europeans do not. Interestingly, however, there is a severe drop in relative 
trust after 2009. Part of that drop reflects the rise in the previous two years. 
As the 2008 crisis hits the various economies there was an immediate loss in 
the trust towards local government, and only later a drop in the trust towards 
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the EU. In 2013 the relative trust in all three geographical areas is lower than 
at the beginning of our sample period (1997), but not by a lot. There are 
exceptions, though. In 1999 Italians trusted the EU much more than their  
own government. In 2013 this difference was cut in half. 
 
In Figure 7 we look at the support toward a common currency. Interestingly, 
this question was asked well before the introduction of the Euro, so we can 
track public opinion for a long time. Surprisingly, we do not observe a 
pattern similar to Figure 2. While there is a decline in support among 
Southern countries, this decline takes place after 2002, not after 2010. The 
Eurozone crisis seems to affect negatively the support for the common 
currency in the countries not in the euro (UK, Denmark and Sweden), which 
see the support drop from 61% to 43% and in the Northern European 
countries (a drop of 20 percentage points) that have been moderately affected 
by the crisis. It does not affect support among Sothern European countries, 
which fluctuates around 60%. A very different picture emerges if we analyze 
the behavior of trust in the ECB. Here the drop after the Eurozone crisis is 
severe, especially among Southern European countries, where the trust in the 
ECB drops from 64% in 2008 to 24% in 2013. 
 
Figure 8 shows a divergence in the pattern of trust toward the euro and trust 
toward the ECB in few selected countries, especially after the global financial 
crisis. While the trust toward the Euro remains strong in most of the 
countries, there is a significant reduction in trust toward the ECB both in 
strong economies (Germany) and in weak   economies   (PIGS).   This   
divergence   suggests   that   European   citizens   are disappointed  about  the  
management  of  the  crisis,  but  maintain  a  relatively  positive attitude 
toward the common currency. An alternative interpretation for being in favor 
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of the Euro while expressing mistrusts towards the ECB is that countries 
anticipate the cost of exiting the single currency and, forcefully, favor the 
status quo. This explanation, which is consistent with the negative feedback 
loop theory described in Section 1, seems validated by the fact that support 
towards the euro dropped substantially for those countries who are not in the 
euro. 
 
4.3 Xenophobia 
 
Thus far we have only used economic variables to explain the changes in 
European sentiment toward the European institutions and the European 
project. It is possible, however, that some cultural variables, such as attitudes 
towards immigration, can explain the deterioration in support for the EU. 
 
To measure attitudes towards immigrants we rely on the European Social 
Study  (ESS).  We  use  two  questions.  The  first  is  “Is  [country]  made  a  worse  or  
a  better  place   to   live  by  people   coming   to   live   here   from  other   countries?”,  
where the answers range from 0 = Worse place to live to 10 = Better place to 
live.  The  second  question  is  “Would  you  say  it   is  generally  bad  or  good  for  
[country]’s   economy   that   people   come   to   live   here   from   other   countries?”,  
where the answers range from 0 = Bad for the economy to 10 = Good for the 
economy. 
 
Figure 9 plots the share of respondents in each country who answer 4 or less 
in these two questions. As we can see, the two responses are highly 
correlated, but they do not show much variation over time. The two countries 
where we see a pronounced increase are Greece and Ireland. Thus, it is 
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unlikely that such slow moving variables can explain the changes in 
Europhilia. 
 
In unreported regressions we try to explain the change in the MEMBERSHIP 
variable with our proxy for xenophobia. The coefficient is statistically 
insignificant both alone and interacted with unemployment, suggesting that 
xenophobia plays no significant role in the decline of support towards the 
European project. 
 
Overall, we can conclude that the economic crisis tends to undermine the 
trust in the European institutions, but not (at least not yet) the beliefs in the 
benefits  of  Europe.  On  a  one  hand,  we  could  say  that  Monnet’s  chain  reaction  
theory might have some validity. If economic crises increase the desire to 
reform European institutions, but do not reduce the desire for Europe, then 
Monnet’s   chain   reaction   might   work.   We   will   return   to   this   in   the   next  
section.   On   the   other   hand,   (contrary   to   Monnet’s   view)   we   see   that   the  
support for Europe dropped any time there was a milestone toward more 
European integration (such as the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2004 
enlargement) and this drop does not seem to disappear with time. Rather, it 
seems cumulative. 
 
 
5. The Three Watershed Moments 
 
The analysis so far only reports correlations based on aggregated data. One 
obstacle to the use of micro-data is the fact that in every survey 
Eurobarometer interviews a different sample of citizens, so it is not possible 
to study in a panel how changes in individual economic conditions affect the 
perception toward the European project. Moreover, many interesting 
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questions are not asked every period, making it impossible to dig deeper into 
the reason of some changes. 
 
To circumvent these problems, we use the pseudo-panel technique (Deaton 
(1985)) by using surveys just before and after the three major turning points 
in the European project (the Maastricht treaty, the 2004 enlargement, and the 
2010 Eurozone crisis). 
 
5.1 The Maastricht Treaty 
 
Figure 10 plots some similar or identical questions which were asked in both 
the March 1992 and 1993 surveys. The graph to the left shows the support for 
the single market. The bars show the share of respondents who in 1992 
answered  “A  Good  Thing”  to  the  question  “Overall,  what  do  you  think  that  
the completion of the Single European  Market  in  1992  will  be?”  On  the  right  
it is represented the percentage of people who in 1993  answer  “Advantages”  
to   the   question   “Do   you   think   that   Single   European   Market   brings   more  
advantages or more disadvantages   for   (OUR   COUNTRY)?”. The two 
questions not being identical, we mostly focused on the differential changes 
across group of countries, rather than on the difference itself. 
 
The most striking fact is that in 1992, when it was approved, there was not a 
majority in favor of the single market. The only countries where the majority 
of the respondents supported the single market were Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece, and Ireland. As a consequence, only in Southern Europe a majority of 
respondents thought that the completion of the single market was a good 
thing, while in the Northern European countries citizens were split in half 
Monnet’s	  Error? 
 32 
among those who thought the change was positive and those who did not. In 
the Center less than 40 percent supported the change. 
 
One  year  after  the  implementation,  respondents  were  asked  to  reflect  
on  the change and decide whether completing the single market was 
advantageous to the domestic economy.  The support drops dramatically in 
the South from 63% to 42% and in the Center from 34% to 18%, while it 
remains substantially stable in the North. 
 
By contrast, in 1992 there is an overwhelming support in all the countries for 
further political integration. The panel on the right of Figure 10 depicts the 
share of respondents who in March 1992 and in March 1993 answered  “For”  
to  the  question  “Are  you  for  or  against   the   formation  of  a  European  Union  
with  a  European  Government  responsible  to  the  European  Parliament?”. 
 
The figure shows that this overwhelming majority deteriorates between 1992 
and 1993 in all geographical areas. The differences, though, are not as 
dramatic as those for support of the single market. In the South support falls 
from 85% to 81%, in the Center from 76% to 65%, and in the North from 50% 
to 40%. 
 
To  try  to  understand  whether  sentiments  toward  the  single  market  or  
the Maastricht treaty are correlated with our variable of interest (whether 
membership is beneficial), we rely on the micro data. Following Deaton 
(1985), we construct a pseudo- panel. For each of the two cross-sections, we 
define synthetic individuals (or, as they are often referred to in literature, 
cohorts, not to be confounded with our generational cohorts used before) 
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identified by a set of demographic characteristics.13 We finally use these units 
as if they were true individuals on a panel data set. 
 
We define cohorts using five characteristics: besides age, we use gender, 
nationality,   education, and job. Variables are recoded in a way that ensures 
approximately equal unconditional probability of belonging to a certain 
cohort (Verbeek and Nijman, 1992). Data are then collapsed averaging values 
across cohorts for each time period (Deaton, 1985) and the corresponding 
synthetic individuals in the two dataset are matched to finally set up the 
pseudo panel.14 Thus, the model we estimate is of the generic form: 
 
(3)       yij =  ij +   xij + j +uij  
 
Where ∆yij is the change in sentiments for the synthetic individual i leaving in 
country j,  ∆xij is the change in the individual specific characteristics and 𝛾j a 
country fixed event. Note that since this is a regression in first differences, the 
country fixed effect 𝛾j captures differences in time trend across countries. 
 
Table 5 presents the results of a regression where the dependent variable is 
the difference in our MEMBERSHIP variable over the period 1992-93. The 
explanatory variables reflect the change of opinion in support for the 
economic integration (Single Market), in support for political integration 
(Single Government), and in support for monetary integration (Single 
currency). All the variables indicating change in support for the advancement                                                          13 Sometimes in literature the term “cohort” is used to specifically define year-of-birth groups. In this case we employ the term in a broader sense (Verbeek, 2008), as groups of individuals sharing some common characteristics among which we include year-of-birth cohorts. 14 To verify that our pseudo-panel well reflects the original data we compare the aggregate behavior of our key variables of interest and check that they exhibit similar trends."  
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of  the  euro  project  have  a  positive  and  statistically  significant coefficient, 
suggesting that the deterioration in Europhilia during this period is linked to 
a worsening in opinions regarding the benefits of a single European market, a 
single currency, and further political integration. Interestingly, no country 
fixed effect, besides Denmark, is significantly different from Germany. 
 
The large drop in MEMBERSHIP variable observed in Figure 2 does not seem 
to be  a  simple  time  effect,  but  it  is  directly  correlated  with  the  support  
for  further integration. What we are unable to explain is the cause of this 
drop, which is generalized across all members. It is reasonable to conjecture 
that is related to the gap between the perception of the European project that 
is portrayed at the official level and the reality perceived by the citizens. In 
light of Eichengreen (2006), European technocrats choose to push agendas 
where the asymmetry of information between them and the voters is large, so 
to avoid political opposition at the time of implementation. Our estimates 
suggest that consensus is higher before the change when voters are less 
informed. However, when the change takes place and voters learn about the 
consequences, support may drop. 
 
5.2 Enlargement of the European Union: 2004 
 
We follow a similar approach to try to explain the variation in Europhilia 
around the 2004 Eastern European enlargement, using a 2002 and a 2005 
survey. In the left panel of Figure 11 we report the fraction of people who 
answered  “For”  to  the  question  “What is your opinion of further enlargement 
of  the  EU  to  include  other  countries  in  future  years”.  In  2002  the  majority  of  
the respondents in each sub-area supported the enlargement. Once again, the 
majority of the support comes from the Southern countries, despite those 
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countries are more likely to lose European subsidies in favor of new poorer 
entrants.  The  Northern  countries  come  second  in  their  support  for  
enlargement,  the Central European last. 
 
In 2005, respondents were asked the same question. Note that while the 
question is the same, the meaning is different. In 2002 the candidates for 
further enlargement were the Eastern European countries that became 
members in 2004, while in 2005 the candidates for further enlargements are 
Turkey and the former Yugoslavian republics that are not members yet. 
Thus, once again, we should focus on the differential change across groups of 
countries, rather than on the change itself. Consensus for further enlargement 
drops across the board, but it drops more in Central and Northern European 
countries than in the South. 
 
In the right panel we plot the fraction of people who states that they were in 
favor of a European Union with a single currency: the Euro. Here the 
question is not only the same, but can also be interpreted in the same way. 
Thus, we can also look at the absolute change. The evidence shows a strong 
support for the single currency in all the geographical areas and a reduction 
in support only in the South, mostly driven by Greece and Spain. 
 
To better understand these shifts in opinions, we use a pseudo-panel to 
correlate the change in the variables presented in Figure 11 with individual 
opinions about the economy and country fixed effects, similar to specification 
(3). The results are presented in Table 6. When the LHS is the change in 
support for further enlargement, the only variable  that  is  statistically  
significant  is  the  change  in  perception  about  the  future national 
economic situation. Not surprisingly, individuals who have a more upbeat 
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view of the future support further enlargements more. The same is true for 
the change in support for the single currency. Here, even the change in 
perception about future national employment situation comes in positive and 
significant. Interestingly, unlike in the previous pseudo-panels, many 
country fixed effects are statistically significant. In part this is the result of the 
poor R-squared. In the previous table we were able to explain 26% of the 
cross sectional variation, in Table 6 less than 5%. Yet, this result suggests that 
the changes in Europhilia around 2004 have more to do with country-specific 
factors than with individual specific-ones. In particular, the regression where 
the dependent variable is the change in support for the single currency 
exhibits significantly negative country fixed effects for all the Southern 
European countries. Thus, it looks like the South of Europe  started  to  fall  
out  of  love  with  the  euro  much  before  the  Eurozone  crisis. However, we 
still need to identify the reason. 
 
5.3 The Eurozone crisis 
 
Figure   2   shows  a   drop   in   the  perception  of  membership’s   advantages  after  
2008. To investigate further this sentiment shift around the Euro crisis we use 
individual data to construct a pseudo panel for the period of 2009-13, like we 
have done for the previous turning points. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the regressions. The LHS variables are 
respectively the changes in support for the Euro (first column), the change in 
trust towards the EU (second column), the change in trust toward the ECB 
(third column), and the change in the  difference  between  percentage  of  
people  supporting  the  Euro  and  percentage  of people trusting the ECB. 
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Unfortunately, the MEMBERSHIP question was not asked in the last period, 
thus we could not use it. 
 
Overall, Table 7 confirms the result obtained on a longer panel with 
aggregate country data (Table 4): economic conditions are highly predictive 
of euro-sentiments. Changes in the perception of the Euro, Trust in the EU, 
and Trust in the ECB are correlated with the change in expectations on future 
personal job situation, household financial situation, as well as changes in 
perception of the national employment situation. 
 
By using aggregate country data – as we did in Table 4-- it is hard to exclude 
that the observed correlations are driven by country-level omitted variables. 
Individual level regressions allow us to measure economic conditions at the 
individual level, providing more credibility to the results. 
 
Table 7 also shows that the economic variables do not eliminate independent 
country-level fixed effects, which remain quantitatively strong and 
statistically significant. 
 
5.4 The Effects of the ECB policy  
 
In explaining the changes in trust toward the ECB the country fixed effects 
are economically and statistical significant. They show that the loss in trust 
towards the ECB has not been homogenous. To what extent the ECB policy 
has reduced Europhilia or, worse, has fed Europhobia? 
 
To answer this question we need to determine first how the ECB policy fitted 
the needs of each country. Figure 12 plots the optimal policy rate (in 
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t 
∗ 
percentage points) and the actual ECB policy rate for each country. The 
optimal policy rate it* is  based  on  a  Taylor’s  (1993)  rule  defined  as   
 
(4)      iit
* = ri
* +  it + 0.5( it   it
* )  (uit  uit
* ) 
  
where  π!" is the inflation rate for country i at time t, measured as the 
change in the non- food, non-energy consumer price index; u!" is the 
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for  each  country  published  by  
Eurostat, u!" is the Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment. In this 
formula, for each country, we set r∗ = π∗ = 2. 
 
It emerges quite clearly that there are two set of countries: the so called PIGS 
(Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain), for which the ECB policy rate is quite 
distant from the optimal national rate, and the rest, for which the ECB policy 
rate approximates well the optimal national rate. 
 
In Figure 13.A we correlate the 2008-2011 drop in MEMBERSHIP with the 
mean absolute deviation of the monetary policy rate from the country Taylor 
rule. There is a clear negative relation, which is statistically significant. The 
PIGS, which were most penalized by the ECB policy, are the ones where 
Europhilia drops the most. The same relationship is present for most of the 
other variables. For example, in Figure 13.B the relationship  between  loss  of  
trust  in  the  ECB  and  mean  absolute  deviation  of  the monetary policy 
rate from the country Taylor rule is almost a perfect straight line. Thus, 
European citizens recognize when the European policy hurts them and 
respond accordingly. 
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The Taylor rule does not simply reflect unemployment but also inflation and 
inflation dispersion was far from negligible over the period of the analysis. If 
we force the  country  Taylor  rule  to  depend  only  on  inflation  and  plot  
the  average  absolute deviations of this Taylor rule from the ECB policy rate 
against the change in trust towards the ECB we find a very similar pattern to 
the one shown in Figure 13 (not reported). This result rules out the possibility 
that the correlations in Figure 13 reflect just the movements in national 
unemployment rates. 
 
Most surprisingly, the only variable that does not seem to be correlated with 
the mean absolute deviation of the monetary policy rate from the country 
Taylor rule is the support for the common currency. As we can see in Figure 
13.C, if anything the relation is positive, albeit not statistically significant. 
 
To understand this paradox we need to realize that even before the 
introduction of a common currency National Central Banks were not 
completely free to set their rates. The EMS system was imposing some limits 
on the ability of each country to deviate from a common interest rate. To see 
how much the introduction of a common currency has worsened the 
monetary policy flexibility of each country we compute the mean absolute 
deviation of the national monetary policy rate from the country Taylor rule in 
the pre euro era (1991-1999). 
 
Figure   14   plots   each   country’s   mean   absolute   deviation of the actual 
monetary policy rate from the country Taylor rule in the euro era against the 
same value in the pre- euro area. The most remarkable fact is that basically 
every country is below the 45 degree line, implying that for no country the 
ECB monetary policy deviated from the optimal country-specific Taylor rule 
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more than what their pre-euro monetary policies deviated from optimal 
country-specific Taylor rules. The three countries that seemed to have gained 
in flexibility are Greece, France, and Finland. 
 
This result helps explain why European citizens blame the ECB, but not the 
common currency. The common currency per se is not the culprit (at least 
vis-à-vis the pre-existing situation). Yet, the ECB policy could have been 
more sensitive to the PIGS country needs.  Hence, the growing distrust 
towards the ECB. 
 
At the same time, citizens seem to draw a distinction between the ECB – the 
manager of monetary policy under the single currency – and the single 
currency itself, blaming the former, not the latter, as suggested by the 
patterns of correlation in Figures 13B and 13C. 
 
 
6. Quo Vadis Europe? 
 
The Eurobarometer being a European institution avoids asking questions that 
might lead to very clear anti-European answers. For this reason, it is not easy 
to find questions that allow us to gauge where Europeans want Europe to go. 
One indirect way we can glance at this issue is a question asked in 2009 and 
2013. European citizens are asked which institution they think is most 
capable to take action against the recent economic crisis. The possible 
answers are the domestic government, the United States, the European 
Union, the International Monetary Fund, and the G20 group. Once again, 
while the question is exactly the same in 2009 and 2013, the context might be 
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales 
41                          
different. In 2009 the crisis was entirely due to a U.S. problem, while by 2013 
the Eurozone crisis had exploded. 
 
Figure 15 plots the answer for the EU 15 divided by geographical areas. Each 
bar represents the share of respondents who mentioned the corresponding 
institution as the most capable. In 2009 the EU is indicated as the most 
capable (or the second most capable) institution to tackle the crisis in all 
groups. The Northern European countries trust more the local government, 
the Center European one the G20. 
 
Surprisingly, the results are not very different in 2013. The Southern 
European countries have lost a bit of confidence toward the EU, but the 
Center and North European once have gained a bit more confidence. This 
evidence is particularly remarkable in face of the fact that between 2010 and 
2013 the European Unions did not show a great degree of coordination and 
ability to act. Yet, in the world everything is relative. May be we can say 
about the EU what Winston Churchill said about democracy: the worst 
institution, until you consider all the existing alternatives. 
 
Another question in Eurobarometer that can help us gauge the overall 
attitude   towards   Europe   is   the   opinion   about   the   direction   of   one’s   own  
country and that of the EU. More specifically, both in 2009 and in 2013 
Eurobarometer   asks   “At   the   present   time,  would   you   say   that,   in   general,  
things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in our 
Country/In   the   EU?”   The   possible   answers   are:   Wrong   Direction,   Neither  
Right Nor Wrong and Right Direction. The bar graphs in Figure 16 show the 
percentage  of  people  who  respond  “Wrong  Direction”  both  for  “our  country”  
(left  panel)  and  for  “the  European  Union”  (right  panel). 
Monnet’s	  Error? 
 42 
Not surprisingly, the percentage of people who think the EU is going in the 
wrong direction increased dramatically between 2009 and 2013, in all three 
groups, particularly so in Southern Europe.  More people think that the EU is 
going in the wrong direction than in the right one. 
 
Yet, it is interesting to contrast the opinion about the direction of the country 
and that of the EU. In Southern Europe more people think the country is 
going in the wrong direction than the EU is. This is not true for the Center 
and  the  North.  To  some  extent,  thus,  there  is  a  negative  “halo”  effect.  People  
unsatisfied with their economic situation blame all institutions. It is hard, 
thus, to take this result as evidence of anti European sentiments. 
 
A partial alternative to Eurobarometer is provided by the Pew Research 
Center. A May 2014 survey conducted by this center shows that in all the 
seven countries surveyed there is a majority of citizens against devolving 
further power to Europe. This majority is 76% in the UK and barely 50% in 
Germany, but always a majority is. The fraction of citizens opposing more 
power to the EU is perfectly negatively correlated with the degree of 
Europhilia of a country. Yet, in all countries, other than Italy, there is a strong 
majority to retain the euro. Thus, Europeans do not seem to want to move 
forward but they do not want to move back either. 
 
Yet, if – as most economists think—the survival of the Euro is dependent 
upon further transfers of national powers to the EU, then the European 
Project is in a catch-22. Europeans do not want to go forward, they do not 
want to go backward, but they cannot stay still. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
While EU membership has strong support in most of the EU-15, this support 
dropped every time the European project made a step forward and never 
recovered. Rightly or wrongly, the Eurozone crisis has contributed to further 
erode this support, albeit the drop appears more related to the terrible 
economic conditions and, thus, it is potentially reversible.  
 
Today a majority of Europeans think that the EU is going in the wrong 
direction. They do not want it to go further, but overall they do not want it to 
go backward either, with all the countries (except Italy) having a pro Euro 
majority. 
 
One possible interpretation of these results is that Europeans like the idea of 
Europe but dislike the way this idea has been implemented. Another possible 
interpretation is that the attempt to jump start the chain reaction has left the 
Continent stuck in a political impasse: in spite of the unpleasant current 
conditions, there is no desire to move forward, while there is too much fear to 
move backward. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that support 
for the euro has plummeted in EU countries not belonging to the Eurozone, 
which do not face this irreversibility problem. Thus, one could infer that if it 
were not for fear of the unknown, even Eurozone countries might be less 
supportive of the common currency. 
 
On  the  one  hand,  Monnet’s  chain  reaction  theory  seems  to  have  worked.  In  
spite of limited support in some countries, European integration has moved 
forward and has become almost irreversible. On the other hand, the strategy 
has worked so far at the cost of jeopardizing the future sustainability. The 
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key   word   is   “almost.”   Europe   and   the   euro   are not irreversible; they are 
simply very costly to revert. As long as the political dissent is not large 
enough,  Monnet’s  chain  reaction  theory  delivered  the  desired  outcome,  albeit  
in a very non-democratic way.  The risk of a dramatic reversal, however, is 
real.  The  European  project  could  probably  survive  a  United  Kingdom’s  exit,  
but it would not survive the exit of a country from the euro, especially if that 
exit is not so costly as everybody anticipates. The risk is that a collapse of the 
euro might bring also the collapse of many European institutions, like the 
free movement of capital, people and goods. In other words, as all chain 
reactions,  also  Monnet’s  one  has  a  hidden  cost:  the  risk  of  a  meltdown. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Differences across countries in sentiments toward membership in European Union  Country fixed effects derived from an OLS regression using individual level data and regressing sentiments towards E.U. membership the first time the respondents of each country are surveyed on individual demographics. Sentiments toward EU membership are derived from the question 
“Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is ...?” Answers were on a 3 point scale (“Good”, “Neither good, 
nor bad,” “Bad”). We coded the question as a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent answered “Good.” Individual demographics: gender, cohort (omitted cohort: born before 1945), education, occupation (omitted job: farmer/fisherman), country fixed effect (omitted country: Germany) and year fixed effect (omitted years: 1973 for the top quadrants, 2002 for the bottom quadrants). Sample period : 1973-1995. For all variable definition see Appendix.   IT ES PT NL LUX DE BE IE FR GR FI AT DK SE UK -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2  
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Figure 2. Evolution of positive sentiments about membership in European Union (E.U. 15)  Share of respondents who answer Good to the question “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is ...?” Answers were on a 3 point scale (Good, Neither good nor bad, Bad). In Panel A the data are arranged by geographic subdivisions in E.U. 15. North: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland. Centre: Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg. South: Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal. In Panel A, to deal with potential compositional effect due to new accessions to the E.U. we have assigned to each country its entry-year membership score in each year before entry (applies to Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Austria). Each country weighs according to its specific sample size (sample at entry-year for post-1973 entrants). In Panel B, C and D the data for each individual country is shown with no backfilling. Source: Eurobarometer surveys from 1973:H2 to 2012:H1.  
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Panel D 
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Figure 3. Differences across time in positive sentiments toward membership in European Union  Year fixed effects derived from an OLS regression using individual level data and regressing sentiments towards E.U. membership on individual demographics. Sentiments toward EU membership are derived from the question “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of 
the European Union is ...?” Answers were on a 3 point scale (“Good”, “Neither good, nor bad,” “Bad”). We coded the question as a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent answered “Good.” Individual demographics: gender, cohort (omitted cohort: born before 1945), education, occupation (omitted job: farmer/fisherman), country fixed effect (omitted country: Germany) and year fixed effect (omitted years: 1973 for the top quadrants, 2002 for the bottom quadrants). Sample period : 1973-2012. For all variable definition see Appendix.    1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 0.3     0.2     0.1     0     -0.1     -0.2     -0.3  
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Figure 4. Cohorts’ positive sentiments toward membership in European Union  Each series represent the coefficients of the cohort dummies in an OLS regression by year of individual sentiments towards the E.U. membership 
(Membership is good) on individual demographics: gender, cohort (omitted cohort: born before 1945), education, occupation (omitted job: farmer/fisherman) and country fixed effect (omitted country: Germany). For variable definition see Appendix. The sample varies according to accessions to the E.U. over time, stopping at E.U. 15: E.U. 9 (FR, BE, NL, IT, DE, LUX, DK, UK, IE) from 1973 to 1981; Greece joins in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; Finland, Sweden and Austria in 1995. Cohorts also stem over time as respondents are selected from citizens of 18 years of age and above. Error bars represent the 95% level confidence interval. Sample period: 1973-2012.     0.15   0.1   0.05   0   -0.05   -0.1   -0.15 1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  Cohort 1946-57 Cohort 1958-67 Cohort 1968-79 Cohort after 1979 
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Figure 5. Evolution of trust toward the European Union (E.U. 15) 
Share of respondents who answer Trust/Tend to trust on a binary scale (Tend to trust, Tend not to trust) to the question:	   “I	  would	   like	   to	  ask	  you	  a	  question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to 
trust	  it….The	  European	  Union”	  The	  data	  are	  arranged	  by	  geographic subdivisions in E.U. 15. North: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland. Centre: Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg. South: Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal.. Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1997-2013. Question asked in all countries in the sample from Eurobarometer 48 (1997Q4) to Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013Q2). Not asked in any wave during 1998, 1999H2, 2000, 2002H2, 2010H2. 
 
 
 
  
20.00% 
30.00% 
40.00% 
50.00% 
60.00% 
70.00% 
80.00% 
South Center North 
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales 
53                                                                                                                                               
 
Figure 6. Evolution of the ratio of trust toward the European Union and national government (E.U. 15) 
 The graph depicts the time series of the ratio between the share of people that answer Trust/Tend to trust on a binary scale (Tend to trust, Tend not to 
trust)	  to	  the	  question:	  “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please 
tell	  me	  if	  you	  tend	  to	  trust	  it	  or	  tend	  not	  to	  trust	  it….The	  European	  Union”	  and the share of people that answer Trust/Tend to trust  to	  the	  question	  “I would 
like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or 
tend	  not	  to	  trust	   it….	  The	  (NATIONALITY) Government” The data are arranged by geographic subdivisions in E.U. 15. North: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland. Centre: Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg. South: Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal.. Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1997-2013. Question asked in all countries in the sample from Eurobarometer 48 (1997Q4) to Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013Q2). Not asked in any wave during 1998, 1999H2, 2000, 2002H2, 2010H2. 
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Figure 7. Evolution of support towards the single currency (E.U. 15) 
Share of respondents who answer For on a binary scale (For, Against) to the question: “What	  is	  your	  opinion	  on	  each	  of	  the	  following	  statements	  ?	  Please	  
tell	  me	  for	  each	  proposal,	  whether	  you	  are	  for	  it	  or	  against	  it…There	  has	  to	  be	  one	  single	  currency,	  the	  euro,	  replacing	  the	  (NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all 
other national	  currencies	  of	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  European	  Union.”	   The data are arranged by geographic subdivisions in E.U. 15. North: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland. North in Eurozone: Ireland, Finland. Centre: Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg. 
South: Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal. Source: Question asked in all countries in the sample from the European Community Study of 1970 (1970Q1) to Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013Q2). Opinions polled before 1991 (4 waves) have been discarded. Each country weighs according to its specific sample. 
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Figure 8. Divergence of trust on Euro and trust towards E.C.B. in selected countries 
Share of respondents who favor the European single currency (blue line): respondents who answer For on a binary scale (For, Against) to the question: 
“What	  is	  your	  opinion	  on	  each	  of	  the	  following	  statements?	  Please	  tell	  me	  for	  each	  proposal,	  whether	  you	  are	  for	  it	  or	  against	  it…There	  has	  to	  be	  one	  single	  
currency, the euro, replacing the (NATIONAL CURRENCY)	   and	  all	   other	  national	   currencies	   of	   the	  member	   states	   of	   the	  European	  Union.” And share of respondents who trust the European Central Bank (red line): respondents who answer Trust/Tend to trust on a binary scale (Tend to trust, Tend not to 
trust) to the question:“And,	  for	  each	  of	  [the	  following	  European	  bodies],	  please	  tell	  me	  if	  you	  tend	  to	  trust	   it	  or	  tend	  not	  to	  trust	   it?...The	  European Central 
Bank”. Black line marks the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (2008:H2). Data at half-yearly frequency. Period: 1999:H1-2013:H1.  
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Figure 9. Evolution of xenophobia over time    
The	  blue	   line	   represents	   the	   time	   series	  of	   the	   average	  value	  of	   a	   variable	   coded	   from	  0	   to	  10	   (0	   =	  Worse	  place	   to	   live,	  …,	   10 = Better place to live) 
corresponding	   to	   the	  answer	  to	   the	   following	  question:	   “Is	   [country]	  made	  a	  worse	  or	  a	  better	  place	   to	   live	  by	  people	   coming	   to live here from other 
countries?”.	   The	   red	   line	   represents	   a	   variable	   coded	   like	   the	   previous	   one	   (scale:	   0	   =	   Bad	   for	   the	   economy,	  …,	   10	   =	   Good	   for	   the	   economy)	   for	   the	  
following	  question:	   “Would	  you	  say	   it	   is	  generally	  bad	  or	  good	   for	   [country]’s	  economy	  that	  people	  come	  to	   live	  here	   from	  other	  countries?”.	  Source:	  European Social Study (E.S.S.) Round 1 (2002/03) to Round 6 (2012/13), variables imwbcnt (blue) and imbgeco (red). Frequency: bi-annual. Sample: E.U. 15. Sample period: 2002-2012. 
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Figure 10. Change in Support for a single European market and for more European political integration, before and after Maastricht 
– EU 12  The two bar graphs depict the average sentiments by region in March 1992 and March 1993.  The bar graph on the left depicts the share of respondents 
who	  answered	  A	  Good	  Thing	  to	  the	  question	  “Overall,	  what	  do	  you	  think	  that	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  Single	  European	  Market	  in	  1992	  will	  be?”	  in	  1992	  and	  
Advantages	  to	  the	  question	  “Do	  you	  think	  that	  Single	  European	  Market	  brings	  more	  advantages	  or	  more	  disadvantages	  for	  (OUR	  COUNTRY)?”	  in	  1993.	  The bar graph on the right depicts the share of respondents who answered	  For	  to	  the	  question	  “Are	  you	  for	  or	  against	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  European	  Union	  
with	  a	  European	  Government	  responsible	  for	  the	  European	  Parliament?”	  	  Sources:	  EB37.0	  and	  EB39.0.	  Sample:	  EU	  12 
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Figure 11. Change in support for further enlargements of the EU and for a single currency, before and after the 2004 Eastern 
European enlargement. – EU 15  The two bar graphs depict average sentiments by region in 2002 and 2005.The two graphs depict the share of respondents who answered For to the 
question	  “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against	  it”.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the graph on the left the statement is Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years. While in the case of the right graph, the statement is A European Monetary Union with a single currency: the Euro. Sources: EB58.1 and EB63.4. Sample: EU 15 
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Figure 12. Distance of national Taylor rule from ECB rate (post 1999)  E.C.B. Marginal Lending Facility Rate (red line) and optimal monetary policy target rates as dictated by a country-specific generalized Taylor rule (blue line). The Taylor rule optimal rate (i୲∗) is defined – for each country – as follows: i୲∗ = r∗ + π୲ + 0.5  (π୲ − π∗) − (u୲ − u୲∗), where  π୲ is the inflation rate measured as the change in the non-food, non-energy consumer price index; u୲ is the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate published by Eurostat (une_rt_q); u୲∗ is the Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment and r∗ = π∗ = 2. Variables are at quarterly frequency except N.A.W.R.U. (annual). For variable definitions see Appendix. All rates have been rescaled in percentage points. Sample period: 1999:Q1-2013:Q4 
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Figure 13. Change in Europhilia (2008-2011) and deviation of ECB policy rate from country Taylor rule (post 1999) 
Panel A. Positive sentiments about EU membership and ECB monetary policy   Change (between 2008 and 2011) in the share of respondents who state that membership in the E.U. is a good thing for their country against the mean absolute difference by country between the ECB during the same period. Marginal Lending Facility rate and the optimal monetary policy target rate as dictated by a country-specific generalized Taylor rule. The average country-specific deviation is computed across the period 1999-2013. The Taylor rule optimal rate (i୲∗) is defined – for each country – as follows: i୲∗ = r∗ + π୲ + 0.5  (π୲ − π∗) − (u୲ − u୲∗), where  π୲ is the inflation rate measured as the change in the non-food, non-energy consumer price index; u୲ is the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate published by Eurostat; u୲∗ is the Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment and r∗ = π∗ = 2. Variables are at quarterly frequency except N.A.W.R.U. (annual). For variable definitions see Appendix. Sample: E.U. 15 countries in the Eurozone. The shaded grey area represents the 95% level confidence interval for the fitted values (blue line) obtained in an O.L.S. univariate regression with constant. t-statistics reported in the upper right corner.  
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Panel B Trust in ECB and and ECB monetary policy  Change (between 2008 and 2011) in the share of respondents who trust the European Central Bank against the mean absolute difference (during the same period) by country between the ECB Marginal Lending Facility rate and the optimal monetary policy target rate as dictated by a country-specific generalized Taylor rule. The average country-specific deviation is computed across the period 1999-2013. The Taylor rule optimal rate (i୲∗) is defined – for each country – as follows: i୲∗ = r∗ + π୲ + 0.5  (π୲ − π∗) − (u୲ − u୲∗), where  π୲ is the inflation rate measured as the change in the non-food, non-energy consumer price index; u୲ is the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate published by Eurostat (une_rt_q); u୲∗ is the Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment and r∗ = π∗ = 2. Variables are at quarterly frequency except N.A.W.R.U. (annual). For variable definitions see Appendix. Sample: E.U. 15 countries in the Eurozone. The shaded grey area represents the 95% level confidence interval for the fitted values (blue line) obtained in an O.L.S. univariate regression with constant. t-statistics reported in the upper right corner. 
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Panel C. Sentiments toward euro and ECB monetary policy  Change (between 2008 and 2011) in the share of respondents who favor the European single currency against the mean absolute difference by country (over the same period) between the ECB. Marginal Lending Facility rate and the optimal monetary policy target rate as dictated by a country-specific generalized Taylor rule. The average country-specific deviation is computed across the period 1999-2013. The Taylor rule optimal rate (i୲∗) is defined – for each country – as follows: i୲∗ = r∗ + π୲ + 0.5  (π୲ − π∗) − (u୲ − u୲∗), where  π୲ is the inflation rate measured as the change in the non-food, non-energy consumer price index; u୲ is the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate published by Eurostat (une_rt_q); u୲∗ is the Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment and r∗ = π∗ = 2. Variables are at quarterly frequency except N.A.W.R.U. (annual). For variable definitions see Appendix. Sample: E.U. 15 countries in the Eurozone. The shaded grey area represents the 95% level confidence interval for the fitted values (blue line) obtained in an O.L.S. univariate regression with constant. t-statistics reported in the upper right corner. 
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Figure 14. National monetary policies (pre 1999) and E.C.B. monetary policy (post 1999) 
Mean absolute difference by country between the National Central Bank discount rate and the optimal monetary policy target rate as dictated by a country-specific generalized Taylor rule in the periods 1991-1999 and 1999-2013. For the latter period, the policy rate is the E.C.B. Marginal Lending Facility rate. The Taylor rule optimal rate (i୲∗) is defined – for each country – as follows: i୲∗ = r∗ + π୲ + 0.5  (π୲ − π∗) − (u୲ − u୲∗), where  π୲ is the inflation rate measured as the change in the non-food, non-energy consumer price index; u୲ is the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate published by Eurostat; Due to lack of data, Greece reports the annual unemployment rate from AMECO for the period 1991:Q1-1998:Q2; u୲∗ is the Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment and r∗ = π∗ = 2.	  Variables	  are	  at	  quarterly	  frequency	  except	  N.A.W.R.U.	  and	  the	  N.C.B.’s	  discount	  rate	  (annual).	  For	  variable	  definitions see Appendix. All rates have been rescaled in percentage points. 45° reference line represented in red. Sample: E.U. 15 countries in the Eurozone. For Luxembourg the discount rate is the same as Belgium by virtue of the BLEU currency union. For France the red line represents the repo rate, as historical discount rates are not available.  
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Figure 15. Most Capable actor to take action against recent economic crisis (2009 and 2013) EU 15  The bar graph below plots the share of respondents who mentioned the corresponding institution when they answered to the question: “In	  your	  opinion,	  
which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic	  crisis?”.   
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Figure 16. Change in perception of general direction before and after Eurocrisis. – EU 15  The two bar graphs depict sentiments by region in 2009 and 2013.  The bar graph on the left depicts the share of respondents answering Wrong Direction to the question “At	  the	  present	  time,	  would	  you	  say	  that,	  in	  general,	  things	  are	  going	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  or	  in	  the	  wrong	  direction,	  in	  our	  Country?”	  The bar graph on the left depicts the share of respondents answering Wrong Direction to the question“At	  the	  present	  time,	  would	  you	  say	  that,	  in	  general,	  things	  are	  
going	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  or	  in	  the	  wrong	  direction,	  in	  the	  European	  Union?” 
Sources: EB72.4 and EB81.0. Sample: EU 15 
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Table 1. Sample statistics 
Panel A. Micro dataset sample statistics (in E.U. 15)  Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max Obs Year of birth 1951.454 19.698 1953 1874 1998 1,359,947 Cohort 2.342 1.305 2 1 5 1,359,947 Age 44.5 18.207 43 15 99 1,359,947 Years of education 11.334 2.875 11 8 16 1,342,736 Gender 0.52 0.5 1 0 1 1,377,914 Occupation 6.13 2.22 6 1 10 1,358,496 Membership is good 0.6 0.49 1 0 1 1,179,098 Country benefitted 0.657 0.475 1 0 1 826,173 For Euro 0.643 0.479 1 0 1 755,180 Trust in the European Union 0.504 0.5 1 0 1 358,269 Trust in the European Central Bank 0.626 0.484 1 0 1 346,474 Left-right self-placement 5.287 2.056 5 1 10 1,047,588 
 
Panel B. Macro panel dataset sample statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max Obs Membership is good (country-year share) 0.609 0.151 0.626 0.254 0.902 500 Country benefitted (country-year share) 0.662 0.156 0.693 0.194 0.968 383 For Euro (country-year share of for) 0.660 0.172 0.700 0.158 0.936 369 Trust in the European Union (country-year share) 0.501 0.135 0.496 0.179 0.767 225 Trust in the European Central Bank (country-year share) 0.628 0.149 0.652 0.165 0.885 225 Unemployment rate 0.076 0.040 0.072 0 0.270 520 Nominal G.D.P. in bn EUR/ECU 494.876 604.504 222.065 1.778 2804.168 520 Gross contributions to E.U. budget in EUR mln 4742.683 5587.023 2282 12 26213.801 473 Gross receipts from the E.U. budget in EUR mln 4185.700 3816.310 2634 6 16355 473 Net receipts from E.U. over nominal G.D.P. 0.006 0.015 -0.001 -0.009 0.065 473 10y government harmonised bond yield spread with German Bund 0.016 0.027 0.004 -0.012 0.21 415 
Dummy	  =	  “2004	  onwards”	  (Eastern	  accession) 0.288 0.453 0 0 1 520 
Dummy	  =	  “Country	  in	  Eurozone” 0.277 0.448 0 0 1 520        
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Panel C. Cross section sample statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max Obs WGI: government effectiveness 1.478 0.574 1.61 0.21 2.36 15 WGI: government control of corruption 1.599 0.72 1.72 0.25 2.53 15 Deaths in WWII over population in 1939 0.026 0.037 0.01 0 0.114 15 Net receipts from E.U. over nominal G.D.P. in first year after accession 0.001 0.006 0 -0.005 0.02 15 Export over nominal G.D.P. at accession 0.296 0.165 0.25 0.114 0.642 15 Percentage difference with average G.D.P. per capita of the EEC/E.U. at accession 2.823 35.802 4.427 -53.723 94.638 15 Exports towards the E.U. over nominal G.D.P. at accession 0.178 0.138 0.124 0.049 0.424 11 Relative genetic distance with other EEC/E.U. countries at entry 99.752 239.503 25.172 17.673 955.026 15 Average share of people against neighbours of a different race (3 earliest waves available) 0.098 0.029 0.091 0.05 0.154 15 Average share of people against foreign workers neighbours (3 earliest waves available) 0.113 0.04 0.11 0.053 0.187 15 Average share of people who are proud of their country (3 earliest waves available) 0.424 0.152 0.396 0.2 0.724 15  
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Panel D. Electoral micro dataset sample statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max Obs Year of birth 1952.422 19.029 1954 1880 1994 282,412 Cohort 2.383 1.304 2 1 5 282,412 Age 44.812 18.026 43 15 99 282,412 Years of education 11.478 2.873 11 8 16 257,041 Gender 0.548 0.53 1 0 2 283,973 Occupation 6.124 2.193 6 1 12 271,195 Membership is good 0.598 0.49 1 0 1 273,567 Country benefitted 0.65 0.477 1 0 1 213,826 For Euro 0.639 0.48 1 0 1 154,554 Trust in National Government 0.455 0.498 0 0 1 112,002 Trust in National Parliament 0.495 0.5 0 0 1 110,301 Trust in the European Union 0.542 0.498 1 0 1 89,327 Trust in the European Central Bank 0.647 0.478 1 0 1 85,564 Respondent voted at last European elections 0.67 0.47 1 0 1 101,946 Respondent intends to vote at next European elections 0.745 0.436 1 0 1 134,194 Respondent voted at last general elections 0.781 0.413 1 0 1 115,703 Left-right self-placement 5.285 2.087 5 1 10 223,995 Respondent voted an Eurosceptic party 0.049 0.216 0 0 1 28,056 Voter turnout behavior because of anti-E.U. feelings 0.056 0.231 0 0 1 31,399  
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Table 2. Sentiments toward Europe at the first survey 
The table depicts average sentiments by country in the first year in which questions are asked in that specific country and included in the survey series. The corresponding wordings of each variable are the ones described in details in the Appendix.     
 Membership is Good Membership Benefits Trust in European Union 
FRA 69.2% (1973) 55.2% (1984) 47.6% (1997) 
BEL 69.9% (1973) 52.0% (1984) 33.2% (1997) 
NED 72.9% (1973) 69.2% (1984) 42.8% (1997) 
GER 70.6% (1973) 40.7% (1984) 36.9% (1997) 
ITA 80.0% (1973) 60.4% (1984) 63.1% (1997) 
LUX 72.5% (1973) 72.9% (1984) 56.3% (1997) 
DEN 46.3% (1973) 44.3% (1984) 40.9% (1997) 
IRE 60.3% (1973) 61.0% (1984) 76.5% (1997) 
UK 36.1% (1973) 34.2% (1984) 36.0% (1997) 
GRE 42.1% (1981) 46.9% (1984) 63.7% (1997) 
SPA 78.3% (1986) 11.9% (1986) 64.2% (1997) 
POR 72.0% (1986) 53.9% (1986) 65.2% (1997) 
FIN 51.8% (1995) 47.4% (1995) 39.2% (1997) 
SWE 39.8% (1995) 30.4% (1995) 24.0% (1997) 
AUS 41.7% (1995) 56.4% (1995) 43.4% (1997) 
  First recording year  First recording year  First recording year   
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Table 3. Cross country determinants of Europhilia  This table correlates country fixed effects in sentiments towards the E.U. and its institutions with country-specific characteristics. Fixed effects have been obtained from an OLS regressions of each of the L.H.S variables reported in bold on individual demographics, according to Model (1) specification in the text. Individual demographics: gender, cohort (omitted cohort: born before 1945), education, occupation (omitted job: farmer/fisherman), country fixed effect (omitted country: Germany). Contrary to previous specifications, the sample has not been restricted to Eurozone members in (3) and (5). Each coefficient has been computed in a univariate O.L.S. regression of one R.H.S. at a time and a constant (not reported). Government effectiveness and ability to control corruption have been taken in difference with their respective values for Germany in 2007. Relative G.D.P. per capita at entry is reported as percentage deviation from the E.U. median in the year of entry. For countries who entered the E.U. before 1976, the entry year has been artificially set to 1976 for lack of older data on contributions and receipts to the E.U. budget. For all variable definitions see Appendix. Significant coefficients are highlighted in bold. Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Unit of observation: country. Sample: E.U. 15. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Fixed effect computed with L.H.S.: Membership is good Benefit For Euro Trust in EU Trust in E.C.B.  Deaths in WWs over pop.‡ -0.558 0.426 0.333 -0.215 -0.315   (0.810) (0.873) (0.571) (0.909) (0.623)  
Gov’t	  effectiveness	  vis	  à	  vis	  German	  gov’t	  (2007) -0.114* -0.0229 -0.110** -0.188*** -0.0398   (0.0614) (0.0735) (0.0376) (0.0558) (0.0515)  
Gov’t	  ability to control corruption -0.0701 0.00617 -0.0810** -0.131** -0.000198   (0.0515) (0.0588) (0.0314) (0.0487) (0.0420)  Relative G.D.P. per capita at entry -0.000494 0.00142 -0.00135* -0.00202* 0.000391   (0.00110) (0.00112) (0.000680) (0.00109) (0.000838)  Net receipts from E.U. over G.D.P. at entry 0.907 6.889 -3.390 16.79*** 7.261   (6.538) (6.718) (4.486) (5.520) (4.565)  Openness to trade (1988) 0.201 0.513 -0.0670 -0.0978 0.403   (0.359) (0.307) (0.272) (0.380) (0.236)  No neigh. of different race 0.812 0.681 1.604* 1.041 0.314   (1.342) (1.44) (0.843) (1.474) (1.034)  No neigh. immigrant worker -0.770 0.927 -0.175 -1.100 -0.499   (0.979) (1.038) (0.700) (1.063) (0.751)  Pride in country -0.307 -0.114 0.182 0.621** -0.0543   (0.248) (0.278) (0.176) (0.232) (0.199)  Genetic distance at entry -8.24e-05 -0.0000769 4.32e-05 -9.76e-05 1.77e-06   (0.000164) (0.000176) (0.000115) (0.000181) (0.000126)  Observations 15† 15† 15† 15† 15†  
†  11 observations for openness to trade in 1988 
‡	  Country	  fixed	  effects	  computed	  restricting	  the	  sample	  to	  pre	  ’45	  cohort.	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Table 4. Positive sentiments about membership in European Union 
O.L.S. regression of the share of respondents who state that membership in the E.U. is a good thing for their country. The panel covers 1973-2012 time span and it is unbalanced since each country of EU15 is included in the panel starting from its year of entry in the EU, which coincides with the first recording year for the variable MEMBERSHIP, just as it is indicated in Table 2. Columns (1)-(3) provide reference baseline regressions: (1) year fixed effects only; (2) country fixed effects only; (3) country and year fixed effects; Year fixed effects are tested for joint significance via F-tests. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level. Bund spread * Eurozone is the interaction of a dummy equal to one for each year after the national currency-Euro	  changeover	  and	  the	  yearly	  average	  yield	  spread	  of	  each	  country’s	  10-years benchmark government bond against the German Bund. For all other variable definitions see Appendix. Unit of observation: country-year. Sample: E.U. 15.  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Maastricht (1992 onward)    -0.0203**  -0.0160*     (0.00948)  (0.00891) Eastern block EU accession (2004 onwards)    -0.0327***  0.00773     (0.0104)  (0.0112) Unemployment     -0.968*** -0.599***      (0.186) (0.158) Bund Spread * Eurozone     -0.747** -0.401      (0.345) (0.341) Eastern block EU accession* South      -0.131***       (0.0210) Constant 0.642*** 0.596*** 0.602*** 0.613*** 0.623*** 0.642***  (0.0486) (0.0144) (0.0299) (0.0148) (0.0287) (0.0169) COUNTRY FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YEAR FE YES NO YES NO YES NO Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500 R-squared 0.143 0.650 0.738 0.666 0.765 0.715 F-test 1.975  3.848  3.9  Prob > F 0.000599   0    0                Sample EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 EU15 Excluded countries Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Excluded years 1973   1973   1973   
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Table 5. Pseudo Panel – 1992-93 The pseudo-panel dataset includes observation from two repeated cross sections in 1992 and 1993. The L.H.S. variable is the time-difference between the 
synthetic	  individuals’	  averages	  (see	  model	  (3))	  of	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  whenever the original respondent states that membership in the E.U. is a good thing for their country. Primary RHS variables (dichotomous 2pt scale of the type For, Against) measure the change in support for the economic integration (Single Market), change in support for political integration (Single Government) and change in support for monetary integration (Single currency). The rest of RHS variables are country dummies with baseline Germany. For detailed variable definitions, see Appendix. Estimation method: OLS on two-periods Panel in F.D. with Country FE. Unit of observation: synthetic individual (cohort) at different points in time. Sources: EB37.0 and EB39.0. Sample: EU 12. Sample period: 1992-1993 (without gaps – delta(1)). Omitted country: Germany.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.  
Pseudo-Panel (1992-1993, delta(1))   
 𝜟 
Is Membership good? 
𝛥 Support for a Single European Market 0.283***  (0.0213) 
𝛥 Support for a Single European Government 0.152***  (0.0238) 
𝛥 Support for a Single Currency 0.160***  (0.0245) France -0.0200  (0.0341) Belgium -0.00715  (0.0345) Netherlands 0.00640  (0.0275) Italy 0.0477  (0.0319) Luxembourg -0.00859  (0.0430) Denmark 0.0812**  (0.0353) Ireland 0.0253  (0.0292) UK 0.0342  (0.0306) Greece -0.0406  (0.0358) Spain -0.0434  (0.0359) Portugal -0.0101  (0.0389) Constant -0.0636***  (0.0196) Observations 1,954 R-squared 0.257 
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Table 6. Pseudo Panel – 2002-2005 The pseudo-panel dataset includes observation from two repeated cross sections in 2002 and 2005. The LHS variables are the time-changes in the 
synthetic	  individuals’	  averages	  (see	  model	  (3))	  of	  dichotomous	  variables	  equal	  to	  1	  whenever	  the	  original	  respondent states that he/she is in favor of Euro currency (1) and of further enlargements (2) of the European Union. Primary RHS variables (3pt scale variables of the type Worse, Same and Better) measure the change in perceptions of the future economic situation at the national, household and personal level. The rest of RHS variables are country dummies with Germany taken as baseline. For detailed variable definitions, see Appendix. Estimation method: OLS on two-periods Panel in F.D. with Country FE. Unit of observation: synthetic individual (cohort) at different points in time. Sources: EB58.1 and EB63.4. Sample: EU 15. Sample period: 2002-2005 (with some gaps – delta(3)). Omitted country: Germany. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.  
Pseudo-Panel (2002-2005, delta(3)) (1) (2) 
 𝛥For Euro 𝛥For Further Enlargement 
𝛥 Expectations	  on	  future	  household’s	  financial	  situation -0.00184 0.0194  (0.0208) (0.0219) 
𝛥 Expectations on future national employment sit. 0.0407** 0.00342  (0.0163) (0.0176) 
𝛥 Expectations on future national economic sit. 0.0364** 0.0595***  (0.0177) (0.0195) 
𝛥 Expectations on future personal job situation -0.00560 0.0351  (0.0233) (0.0255) France 0.0811* 0.142***  (0.0415) (0.0427) Belgium 0.0352 0.183***  (0.0369) (0.0438) Netherlands 0.0299 0.0566  (0.0416) (0.0440) Italy -0.0816** 0.218***  (0.0406) (0.0412) Luxembourg -0.00954 0.0128  (0.0349) (0.0583) Denmark -0.0553 -0.0403  (0.0442) (0.0469) Ireland 0.0540 0.106**  (0.0333) (0.0442) UK 0.00678 0.203***  (0.0411) (0.0415) Greece -0.172*** 0.0873**  (0.0428) (0.0399) Spain -0.0855** 0.171***  (0.0403) (0.0448) Portugal 0.0181 0.242***  (0.0403) (0.0465) Finland 0.0697* 0.104**  (0.0383) (0.0437) Sweden 0.0439 0.0881**  (0.0386) (0.0417) Austria -0.0735** 0.00648  (0.0362) (0.0431) Constant  -0.0558** -0.288***  (0.0248) (0.0264) Observations 2,639 2,530 R-squared 0.044 0.046 
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Table 7. Pseudo Panel – 2010 Euro-Crisis. The pseudo-panel dataset includes observation from two repeated cross sections in 2009 and 2013. The LHS variables in the first 3 specifications are the time-changes	  in	  the	  synthetic	  individuals’	  support	  (see	  model	  (3))	  for	  the	  Euro,	  Trust	  in	  EU,	  and	  Trust  in ECB (variables detailed in the appendix), while the fourth specification shows as dependent variable the difference between LHS in (1) and LHS in (3). The first RHS (3pt scale variables of the type Worse, Same and Better) controls for the change in expectations for future personal employment situation. The second and the third (4pt scale variables of the 
type	  [Very	  Bad,	  Very	  Good])	  control	  for	  the	  change	  in	  perception	  of	  current	  household’s	  and	  national	  economic	  situation.	  The	   rest of RHS variables are country dummies with Germany taken as baseline. For detailed variable definitions, see Appendix. Estimation method: OLS on two-periods Panel in F.D. with Country FE. Unit of observation: synthetic individual (cohort) at different points in time. Sources: EB72.4 and EB81.0. Sample: EU 15. Sample period: 2009-2013 (with some gaps – delta(4)). Omitted country: Germany. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudo-Panel (2009-2013, delta(4)) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝛥 For Euro 𝛥 Trust in EU 𝛥 Trust in ECB 𝛥 difference between For Euro and Trust in ECB 
𝛥 Expectations on future personal job situation 0.0399** 0.0947*** 0.0407** 0.000865  (0.0184) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0258) 
𝛥 Household financial situation 0.0374*** 0.0419*** 0.0449*** -0.00769  (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0117) (0.0142) 
𝛥 Perception of national employment situation 0.0510*** 0.0778*** 0.0739*** -0.0198  (0.0110) (0.0117) (0.0127) (0.0148) France 0.0267 0.209*** 0.221*** -0.195***  (0.0482) (0.0505) (0.0507) (0.0664) Belgium -0.0762* 0.199*** 0.136*** -0.201***  (0.0439) (0.0494) (0.0496) (0.0602) Netherlands -0.0193 0.126** 0.164*** -0.181***  (0.0492) (0.0561) (0.0544) (0.0697) Italy 0.0154 0.0457 0.136** -0.144**  (0.0496) (0.0509) (0.0546) (0.0678) Luxembourg -0.0140 0.0991 0.274*** -0.243***  (0.0531) (0.0625) (0.0608) (0.0780) Denmark -0.226*** 0.138** 0.189*** -0.390***  (0.0527) (0.0562) (0.0566) (0.0735) Ireland -0.118*** 0.129*** 0.0267 -0.126**  (0.0400) (0.0490) (0.0477) (0.0619) UK -0.129*** 0.286*** 0.196*** -0.303***  (0.0425) (0.0458) (0.0475) (0.0642) Greece 0.141*** -0.00469 0.0153 0.130**  (0.0521) (0.0495) (0.0499) (0.0654) Spain -0.0218 -0.0708 -0.0588 0.0498  (0.0461) (0.0510) (0.0506) (0.0673) Portugal -0.131*** -0.0861 -0.0587 -0.0589  (0.0498) (0.0560) (0.0544) (0.0684) Finland 0.0754* 0.278*** 0.132** -0.0469  (0.0430) (0.0534) (0.0526) (0.0686) Sweden -0.300*** 0.189*** 0.136** -0.430***  (0.0479) (0.0539) (0.0531) (0.0670) Austria -0.0411 0.231*** 0.128*** -0.181***  (0.0444) (0.0472) (0.0483) (0.0608) Constant  -0.0398 -0.334*** -0.294*** 0.249***  (0.0325) (0.0365) (0.0358) (0.0483) Observations 2,615 2,559 2,462 2,412 R-squared 0.073 0.122 0.082 0.066 
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Table 8. Sentiments towards the Euro 
Percentage of people who favors giving more decision-making	  power	  to	  the	  EU	  to	  deal	  with	  Europe’s	  economic	  problems.	  	  Percentage	  of	  people	  %	  who	  thinks country should keep the Euro as their currency or return to their original currency (franc/mark/peseta/lira/drachma).Source: 2014 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey  
 
  More power to EU Euro  Favor Against Keep euro Return to currency Germany 47 50 72 27 France  45 55 64 36 Poland  44 41   Spain  43 53 68 29 Italy 38 50 45 44 Greece  27 71 69 26 UK  19 76   
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Appendix 
Data description Most of the details on the data are covered in the data section in the paper. Here we list the variable definition and additional information on how we treat the data. In the Eurobarometer surveys, prior to the German unification, Germany was only West Germany. 
Table A1: Variables Definition 
i. Eurosupport Variables 
Membership is good 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2012. 
Description: Share of respondents who answer Good on a 3pt scale (Good, Neither 
good nor bad, Bad). Question asked in all countries in the sample from the European Community Study of 1973 (1973Q3) to Eurobarometer 77.4 (2012Q2). Not asked in any wave during 1974H1 or 2011H2. 
Example of wording: EB64.2 “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR 
COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is ...?”  
Country benefitted 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1984-2011. 
Description: Share of respondents who answer Benefitted on a binary scale (Benefitted, Not benefitted). Question asked in all countries in the sample from Eurobarometer 21 (1984Q2) to Eurobarometer 75.3 (2011Q2). Not asked in any wave during 2010H2. 
Example of wording: EB64.2 “Taking everything into consideration, would you say 
that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefitted or not from being a member of the 
European Union?”  
For Euro 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1991-2013 
Description: Share of respondents who answer For on a binary scale (For, 
Against). Question asked in all countries in the sample from the European Community Study of 1970 (1970Q1) to Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013Q2). Opinions polled before 1991 (4 waves) have been discarded. 
Example of wording: EB64.2: “What is your opinion on each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against 
it…There has to be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the (NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all other national currencies of the member states of the 
European Union”  
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Expectations on future household’s financial situation 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013. 
Description: The variable can assume values   ∈ {−1,0,1} corresponding to, respectively, the answers Worse, Same and Better. Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB58.1 “(With respect to your household’s future financial 
situation) What your expectation for the next 12 months?”  
Expectations on future national employment situation 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013. 
Description: The variable can assume values   ∈ {−1,0,1} corresponding to, respectively, the answers Worse, Same and Better. Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB58.1 “(With respect to your country’s future national 
employment situation) What your expectation for the next 12 months?”  
Expectations on future national economic situation 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013. 
Description: The variable can assume values   ∈ {−1,0,1} corresponding to, respectively, the answers Worse, Same and Better. Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB58.1 “(With respect to your country’s future general 
economic situation) What your expectation for the next 12 months?”  
Expectations on future personal employment situation 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013. 
Description: The variable can assume values   ∈ {−1,0,1} corresponding to, respectively, the answers Worse, Same and Better. Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB58.1 “(With respect to your future employment situation) 
What your expectation for the next 12 months?”  
Households financial situation 
Source: Eurobarometer 2009, 2013 
Description: The variable can assume integers values from -2 to +2, corresponding to answers ranging from Very Bad to Very Good. Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB80.1 “How would you judge the financial situation of your 
household?”.  
Perception of National employment situation 
Source: Eurobarometer 2009, 2013 
Description: The variable can assume integers values from -2 to +2, corresponding to answers ranging from Very Bad to Very Good. Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB80.1 “How would you judge the current employment 
situation in your country?”.  
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Support for a Single European Market 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1992-1993 
Description: Dichotomous variable coded on the basis of 2pt scale answers (A 
Good Thing, A bad thing) or (An advantage, A disadvantage). Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB37.0: “Overall, what do you think that the completion of the 
Single European Market in 1992 will be?”  
Support for a Single European Government 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1992-1993 
Description: Dichotomous variable coded on the basis of 2pt scale answers (For, 
Against). Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB39.0 “What is your opinion on each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it 
– The Community should have a European Government responsible for the 
European Parliament“.  
Support for a Single European Currency 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1992-1993 
Description: Dichotomous variable coded on the basis of 2pt scale answers (For, 
Against). Question asked in all countries in the sample considered. 
Example of wording: EB39.0 “What is your opinion on each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it 
– There should be a European Single Currency replacing all national currencies”. 
 
Trust in the European Union 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1997-2013 
Description: Share of respondents who answer Trust/Tend to trust on a binary scale (Tend to trust, Tend not to trust). Question asked in all countries in the sample from Eurobarometer 48 (1997Q4) to Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013Q2). Not asked in any wave during 1998, 1999H2, 2000, 2002H2, 2010H2. 
Example of wording: EB73.4, Q.A14.4 “I would like to ask you a question about 
how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following 
institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it….The 
European Union”  
Trust in the European Central Bank 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1999-2012 
Description: Share of respondents who answer Trust/Tend to trust on a binary scale (Tend to trust, Tend not to trust). Question asked in all countries in the sample from Eurobarometer 51 (1999Q1) to Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013Q2). Not asked in any wave during 2002H1 and 2010H2. 
Example of wording: EB61, Q.23.6 “And, for each of [the following European 
bodies], please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?...The European 
Central Bank”  
Trust in National Parliament 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1997-2013 
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Description: Share of respondents who answer Trust/Tend to trust on a binary scale (Tend to trust, Tend not to trust). Question asked in all countries in the sample from Eurobarometer 48 (1997Q4) to Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013Q2). Not asked in any wave during 1998, 1999H2, 2000H1, 2002H2, 2010H2. 
Example of wording: EB73.4, Q.A14.3 “I would like to ask you a question about 
how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following 
institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it….The (NATIONALITY Parliament)”  
Trust in National Government 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1997-2013 
Description: Share of respondents who answer Trust/Tend to trust on a binary scale (Tend to trust, Tend not to trust). Question asked in all countries in the sample from Eurobarometer 48 (1997Q4) to Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013Q2). Not asked in any wave during 1998, 1999H2, 2000H1, 2002H2, 2010H2. 
Example of wording: EB73.4, Q.A14.2 “I would like to ask you a question about how 
much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, 
please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it….The (NATIONALITY 
Government)” 
 
ii. Demographics 
Age 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: individual age of respondent in years. 
Example of wording: EB28, Q.67: “Can you tell me your date of birth please?”. EB43, D.11: “How old are you?” 
 
Year of birth 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: individual year of birth of respondent computed on the basis of the individual age variable.  
Cohort 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: cohort defined by the authors as follows, on the basis of the individual year of birth.  1. Born before 1945  2. Born between 1946 and 1957  3. Born between 1958 and 1967  4. Born between 1968 and 1979  5. Born after 1979  
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Years of education 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: individual years of education, computed on the basis of information on the age at which respondent left school (provided either recoded in groups or exact). It assumes education starts compulsorily for all Europeans at 8 years of age.  
Gender 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: Sex of respondent (Female = 1).  
Occupation 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: Occupation of respondent recoded in 10 categories. 1. Farmer, Fisherman (Skipper); 2. Professional - Lawyer, Accountant, Etc; 3. Business - Owner Of Shop, Craftsman, Proprietor; 4. Manual Worker; 5. White Collar - Office Worker; 6. Executive, Top Management, Director; 7. Retired; 8. Housewife, Not Otherwise Employed; 9. Student, Military Service; 10. Unemployed, D.K., N.A. 
Example of wording: EB38, D.15A: “What is your current occupation?”  
Left-right self-placement 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: Respondent is asked to place his/her political views on a 10 point scale (1 = Left, …, 10 = Right). 
Example of wording: EB38, D.1: “In political matters people talk of "the left" and 
"the right". How would you place your views on this scale?” 
 
 
iii. Macro-economic Variables 
 
Unemployment rate 
Source: AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic Database of the European Commission). Series: ZUTN 
Description: Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population (labour force). Quarterly frequency. Period: 1960-2013  
NAWRU 
Source: AMECO database. Series: ZNAWRU 
Description: Non-accelerating wages rate of unemployment. Annual frequency. Period: 1965-2013  
Inflation rate (non-food, non-energy) 
Source: OECD. Series: Consumer Price Indices (MEI database) 
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Description: Consumer prices - all items non-food, non-energy. Percentage change on the same period of the previous year. Quarterly frequency. Period: 1970-2013  
E.C.B. Marginal Lending Facility Rate (MLR) 
Source: European Central Bank, Key E.C.B. interest rates, Marginal Lending Facility (http://www.ECB.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html). 
Description: The Eurosystem Marginal Lending Facility Rate is the interest rate at which mayor financial institutions obtain overnight liquidity from national central banks in the Eurosystem, against eligible assets. Interest rate levels in percentages per annum. MLR revisions have been recast at quarterly frequency. In the occurrence of policy rate revisions during a given quarter, we impute the average of all standing rates during that quarter. Period: 1999-2013  
National central bank discount rate 
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. Series: line 60 
Description: The Discount Rate/Bank Rate (d60) is the rate at which the central banks lend or discount eligible paper for deposit money banks, typically shown on an end-of- period basis. Luxembourg and Belgium show the same figures by virtue of the Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union, which pegged the Luxembourgish franc to the Belgian franc since 1921. Period: 1984-1998 
 
REPO rate (France) 
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. Series: line 60lcr 
Description: Repos (Repurchase Agreements) is the counterpart of cash received against securities/gold sold under a firm commitment to repurchase the securities/gold at a fidxed rate on a specified date. The repo series includes holdings by households and non-financial corporations. For lack of data, this series substitutes the Banque de France discount rate in the pre-E.C.B. years. Period: 1984-1998  
Nominal G.D.P. in bn EUR/ECU 
Source: AMECO. Series: UVGN 
Description: Gross national income at current market prices (EUR/ECU bn). Period: 1971-2013  
Real G.D.P. (2005 prices) in bn EUR 
Source: AMECO. Series: OVGD 
Description: Gross domestic product at 2005 market prices (EUR bn). Period: 1960-2013  
Gross contributions to – and receipts from – the E.U. budget in EUR mln 
Source: Kauppi and Widgren (2004) for the period 1976-2001 and Financial Programming and Budget - Revenue and Expenditures file for 2001-2012 (http://ec.europa.eu/budget/revexp/revenue_and_expenditure_files/data/revenue_and_expenditure_en.xls) 
Description: Receipts: Total expenditures in the E.U. budget. Contributions: Total own resources (Traditional own resources + total national contribution) 
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10-year government harmonized bond spread with German Bund 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. Series: LXESSFUB, BDESSFUB, ITESSFUB, FRESSFUB, DKESSFUB, IRESSFUB , NLESSFUB, BGESSFUB, GRESSFUB,  OEESSFUB, SDESSFUB, ESESSFUB , FNESSFUB, PTESSFUB, UKESSFUB 
Description: 10-year benchmark/harmonized government bond yields in percentage points, at daily frequency. Data have been recast at yearly frequency by taking the average within years and are expressed in difference from the German Government Bond. Period: 1980-2013  
Exports towards the EU 
Source: Eurostat. Series: DS-016890 
Description: Bilateral trade flows since 1988 by CN8. For each E.U. country, data have been aggregated by trade partner to obtain the value of exports in billion EUR (current) to other EU/EEC countries. Period: 1988-2012.  
Value of exports in current prices 
Source: Eurostat. Series: nama_exi_c 
Description: Exports and imports by Member States of the EU/third countries, current prices. Period: 1957-2013  
Foreign residents by country of citizenship 
Source: Eurostat. Series: migr_pop1ctz 
Description: Resident population by sex, age group and citizenship. For each E.U. country, data have been aggregated by citizenship to obtain the stock of immigrants from the EU. Period: 1998-2012   
iv. Country-specific Institutional/cultural Variables  
World Governance Indicator: government effectiveness 
Source: World Bank 
Description: Index capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (increasing in government capacity). Methodology described in Kauffman et al (2010), Policy 
Reference: Research Working Paper 5430. The measure is provided with 90% confidence intervals and standard error, but we use the point estimate. Period: 1996-2012.  
World Government Indicator: control of corruption 
Source: World Bank 
Description: Index capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (decreasing in corruption). Methodology described in Kauffman et al (2010), Policy Reference: 
Research Working Paper 5430. The measure is provided with 90% confidence intervals and standard error, but we use the point estimate. Period: 1996-2012.  
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Deaths in the World Wars 
Source: Wikipedia, World War II casualties (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties) and World War I casualities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_casualties). 
Description: The sum of civilian and military deaths during World War I as a percentage of 1915 population and civilian and military deaths during World War II as a percentage of 1939 population.  
Population 
Source: Eurostat. Series: demo_pjan_1 
Description: Total resident population on 1st January. Frequency: annual. Period: 1960-2013  
Genetic distance 
Source: Authors database from E. Spolaore and R. Wacziarg, The Diffusion of 
Development, QJE 2009; version of 8/8/2008 
Description: Bilateral genetic distances between countries. For missing data (e.g. former Yugoslavia) we have used the genetic distances of a genetically identical country (e.g. one with genetic distance equal to zero). Data have been aggregated to compute weighted genetic distances of each country with the rest of the E.U. at each point in time. Frequency: yearly (genetic distances are constant over time, population and E.U. member countries change). Period: 1960-2013.  
Racism: immigrants make [country] worse place to live 
Source: European Social Studies, Round 1 to Round 6. Series: imwbcnt 
Description: Share of respondents who answer 4 or less on an 11pt scale (0 = 
Worse place to live, …, 10 = Better place to live). Frequency: bi-annual. Period: 2002-2012 
Wording: “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to 
live here from other countries?”  
Racism: immigrant workers are bad for [country]’s economy 
Source: European Social Study, Round 1 to Round 6. Series: imbgeco 
Description: Share of respondents who answer 4 or less on an 11pt scale (0 = Bad 
for the economy, …, 10 = Good for the economy). Frequency: bi-annual. Period: 2002-2012 
Wording: Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that 
people come to live here from other countries?  
Racism: don't like as neighbors: people of different race 
Source: European/World Value Survey 
Description: Share of respondent who mention People of a different race on a 2pt scale (0 = Not mentioned, 1 = Mentioned). Variable has been summarized by country as the average of the oldest three waves available. Period (EVS): 1981, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2000, 2008, 2009. Period (WVS): 1981-84, 1983-93, 1994-99, 1999-04, 2005-09, 2010-14 
Wording: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any 
that you would not like not to have as neighbors? …People of a different race 
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Racism: don’t like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers 
Source: European/World Value Survey 
Description: :  Share of respondent who mention People of a different race on a 2pt scale (0 = Not mentioned, 1 = Mentioned). Variable has been summarized by country as the average of the oldest three waves available. Period (EVS): 1981, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2000, 2008, 2009; Period (WVS): 1981-84, 1983-93, 1994-99, 1999-04, 2005-09, 2010-14 
Wording: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any 
that you would not like not to have as neighbors? … Immigrants/foreign workers  
Nationalism: how proud are you to be a ... (country) citizen 
Source: European/World Value Survey 
Description: Share of respondents who declare themselves Very Proud on a 4pt scale (1 = Very Proud, 2 = Quite Proud, 3 = Not very proud, 4 = Not at all proud). Variable has been summarized by country as the average of the oldest three waves available. Period (EVS): 1981, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2000, 2008, 2009. Period (WVS): 1981-84, 1983-93, 1994-99, 1999-04, 2005-09, 2010-14 
Wording: How proud are you to be [nationality]?  
Dummy = “2004 onwards” (Eastern block accession) 
Description: dummy = 1 for all countries in 2004 and subsequent years.  
Dummy = “Country in Eurozone” (Eurozone) 
Description: country-specific dummy = 1 for each year after the changeover from the former national currency to the Euro.  
v. Electoral Variables 
Intentional turnout at the European Parliament elections 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2009. 
Description: Share of respondents who declare their likelihood to vote in the next European elections is 5 or above on a 10pt scale (1 = Definitely not vote,…, 10 = 
Definitely vote). Alternatively, it is the share of respondents who declare their likelihood to vote in the next European elections is 2 or above when the question is measured on a 4pt scale (1 = Will certainly go and vote,…, 4 = Will certainly not 
vote). 2pt scale: EB51 (1999) 4pt scale: EB11 (1979), EB21 (1984), EB30 (1988), EB31 (1989), EB40 (1993), EB41 (1994) 10pt scale: EB69.2 (2008), EB70.1 (2008), EB71.1 (2009) 
Examples of wording:    EB51, Q.30: “The next elections to the European Parliament will take 
place this June in each member State. […] b) Do you intend to vote in the next 
European Parlament	  elections	  this	  June?”   EB71.1, Q.C3: “Can you tell me on a scale of 1 to 10 how likely it is 
that you would vote in the next European elections in [date]? Please place yourself 
at a point on this scale where '1' indicates that you would "definitely not vote", '10' 
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indicates that you would "definitely vote" and the remaining numbers indicates 
something in between these two positions.”   EB21, Q.349: “Next June, the citizens of countries belonging to the 
European community, including the (NATIONALITY) will be asked to vote to elect 
members of the 
European parliament. Do you think that you will certainly go and vote, probably go 
and vote, probably will not vote, or certainly will not vote?”  
Turnout at the European Parliament elections 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: Share of respondents who declared to have voted at the last European Parliament elections on the total of all eligible voters in the sample by country (binary variable). 
Examples of wording:   EB12, Q.120 “In this first European election a lot of people in some 
of the countries did not go and vote. Were you of voting age at the time of this 
election? If yes, were you able to go and vote or didn’t you vote?”   EES2004, Q.09 "A lot of people abstained in the European 
Parliament elections of [date], while others voted. Did you cast your vote?”  
Turnout at the national general elections 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: Share of respondents who voted any political party at the last general elections over the total of all eligible voters in the sample by country. 
Wording: EB.31, Q.533/534 “Which party did you vote for at the [general election] 
of [year of the last general election]?”  
Vote to an Eurosceptic party at European Parliament elections 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1973-2013. European Election studies 1999, 2004, 2009. 
Description: For each of the European elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009, we computed the share of respondents who voted for an Eurosceptic political party among all respondents who declared to vote in that election. Eurosceptic parties are listed in a separate appendix. 
 
Voter turnout behavior because of anti-E.U. feelings 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 52.0 (1999Q4) and 71.3 (2009Q2) 
Description: Share of respondents who declared to have abstained from voting at the last European elections because they oppose the E.U. plus the share of respondents who declared they voted at the last European elections because they oppose the E.U. 
Wording: EB.52, Q.42: “What were the two main reasons why you voted in the 
European Parliament elections?... I was/am against the European Union”. Q.43: 
“What were the two main reasons why you did NOT vote in that election?... I am 
opposed to the European Union”  
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European Parliament: Results of the European elections. Turnout by 
country 
Source: http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/turnout.html 
Description: Current and historical turnout at the elections for the European Parliament (%). Period: 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014.  
European Parliament: Results of the European elections. Result by national 
party 
Source: http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-introduction-2014.html 
Description: Current and historical results by national political party at the elections for the European Parliament (%). Period: 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014.   
Table A2 List of Eurobarometer waves in sample   
Eurobarometer wave Date Respondents Percent of the overall sample 
    
European Community Study 
1970 1970Q1 8,567 0.53 
European Community Study 
1973 1973Q3 13,484 0.83 
    
2.0 1974Q4 9,060 0.56 
3.0 1975Q2 9,561 0.59 
4.0 1975Q4 9,133 0.56 
5.0 1976Q2 8,575 0.53 
6.0 1976Q4 9,084 0.56 
7.0 1977Q2 9,056 0.56 
8.0 1977Q4 8,788 0.54 
9.0 1978Q2 9,151 0.56 
10.0 1978Q4 8,677 0.53 
11.0 1979Q2 8,884 0.55 
12.0 1979Q4 8,989 0.55 
13.0 1980Q2 8,819 0.54 
14.0 1980Q4 9,985 0.61 
15.0 1981Q2 9,898 0.61 
16.0 1981Q4 9,903 0.61 
17.0 1982Q2 11,772 0.72 
18.0 1982Q4 9,682 0.59 
19.0 1983Q2 9,790 0.60 
20.0 1983Q4 9,718 0.60 
21.0 1984Q2 9,746 0.60 
22.0 1984Q4 9,907 0.61 
23.0 1985Q2 9,929 0.61 
24.0 1985Q4 11,849 0.73 
25.0 1986Q2 11,831 0.73 
26.0 1986Q4 11,837 0.73 
27.0 1987Q2 11,651 0.71 
28.0 1987Q4 11,583 0.71 
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29.0 1988Q2 11,729 0.72 
30.0 1988Q4 11,791 0.72 
31.0 1989Q1 11,678 0.72 
31.A 1989Q2 11,819 0.73 
32.0 1989Q4 23,395 1.44 
33.0 1990Q2 11,775 0.72 
34.0 1990Q4 13,883 0.85 
34.2 1990Q4 7,706 0.47 
35.0 1991Q2 13,121 0.81 
35.A 1991Q1 12,819 0.79 
35.1 1991Q2 13,149 0.81 
36.0 1991Q4 13,004 0.80 
37.0 1992Q1 13,082 0.80 
38.0 1992Q3 13,008 0.80 
38.1 1992Q4 13,024 0.80 
39.0 1993Q2 14,142 0.87 
40.0 1993Q4 14,068 0.86 
41.0 1994Q1 13,029 0.80 
41.1 1994Q2 13,096 0.80 
42.0 1994Q4 15,644 0.96 
43.0 1995Q1 16,238 1.00 
43.1 1995Q2 16,166 0.99 
43.1B 1995Q2 16,300 1.00 
44.1 1995Q4 16,346 1.00 
44.2B 1996Q1 61,805 3.79 
45.1 1996Q2 16,335 1.00 
46.0 1996Q4 16,248 1.00 
46.1 1996Q4 16,246 1.00 
47.0 1997Q1 16,362 1.00 
47.1 1997Q2 16,154 0.99 
47.2 1997Q2 16,201 0.99 
48.0 1997Q4 16,186 0.99 
49.0 1998Q2 16,165 0.99 
50.0 1998Q4 16,155 0.99 
51.0 1999Q1 16,179 0.99 
52.0 1999Q4 16,071 0.99 
53.0 2000Q2 16,078 0.99 
54.1 2000Q4 16,067 0.99 
55.1 2001Q2 16,163 0.99 
56.2 2001Q4 15,939 0.98 
56.3 2002Q1 16,038 0.98 
57.1 2002Q2 16,012 0.98 
58.1 2002Q4 16,074 0.99 
59.0 2003Q1 16,370 1.00 
59.1 2003Q2 16,307 1.00 
59.2 2003Q2 16,161 0.99 
60.1 2003Q4 16,082 0.99 
61.0 2004Q1 16,216 1.00 
62.0 2004Q3 27,807 1.71 
62.2 2004Q4 27,008 1.66 
63.4 2005Q2 27,823 1.71 
64.2 2005Q4 27,925 1.71 
65.1 2006Q1 24,750 1.52 
Monnet’s	  Error? 
  88 
65.2 2006Q2 27,665 1.70 
66.1 2006Q4 27,647 1.70 
67.2 2007Q2 27,717 1.70 
68.1 2007Q4 27,768 1.70 
69.2 2008Q1 27,661 1.70 
70.1 2008Q4 27,618 1.69 
71.1 2009Q1 27,718 1.70 
71.3 2009Q2 27,830 1.71 
72.4 2009Q4 27,731 1.70 
73.4 2010Q2 27,641 1.70 
75.3 2011Q2 27,713 1.70 
76.3 2011Q4 27,594 1.69 
77.3 2012Q2 27,637 1.70 
77.4 2012Q2 26,622 1.63 
78.1 2012Q4 27,622 1.69 
79.3 
80.115 
2013Q2 2013Q4 27,605 32,411 1.69  
    
Total  1,629,637 100 
 
                                                        15 This wave was used only in the pseudo panel analysis of section 5 since one of the main variables MEMBERSHIP was not collected in this survey. Thus, we do not report the size of the sample as a percentage of the overall sample because it is not used in the other figures and tables. 
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